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PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT: THE ROLE OF INTENT IN APPELLATE
REVIEW
Paul J. Spiegelman*
Almost seventy years ago, Roscoe Pound observed that:
The number of new trials for grave misconduct of the
public prosecutor which may be found in the reports
throughout the land in the past two decades is significant.
We must go back to the seventeenth century-to the trial of
Raleigh or to the prosecution under Jeffreys-to find
parallels for the abuse and disregard of forensic propriety
which threatens to become staple in American
prosecutions.
Pound's fears that prosecutorial misconduct would become
commonplace appear to have come true.2  Judges and
commentators4  have been criticizing the performance of
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author was the appellate
counsel for Shawn Hill in People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1998). The author acknowledges
the assistance of his colleagues Maureen Markey, Linda Berger, and Hadley Batchelder for
their advice on earlier drafts, and the generous financial support of the Thomas Jefferson
School of Law.
1. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (1930).
2. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10.1, at 10-2 (updated
1996) (noting that misconduct has in fact "become staple in American prosecutions" and that
"such misconduct shows no sign of abating or being checked by institutional or other
sanctions").
3. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J.
dissenting); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle:
Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 333-36 (1985); Albert
Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629,
644 (1972) (courts have been reviewing allegedly improper arguments since "at least the
1850's"); David Crump, The Functions and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw.
L.J. 505 (1974); Mark S. Davies, Enlisting the Jury in the "War on Drugs": A Proposed Ban
on Prosecutors' Use of "War on Drugs" During Opening and Closing Argument of a
Narcotics Trial, 1994- U. CHI. LEGAL F. 395 (1994); J. Allison DeFour, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L. REV. 443, 448 (1983); James Joseph Duane,
What Message are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to "Send a Message"
With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565 (1995); Bennett L. Gershman, The New
Prosecutors, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 393 (1992); Bennett L. Gershman, Why Prosecutors
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prosecutors in closing arguments and the failure of courts to
control them ever since.
Perhaps the most often cited judicial expression of
exasperation with court handling of improper prosecutorial
argument was uttered more than fifty years ago by Judge Jerome
Frank of the Second Circuit:
This court has several times used vigorous language in
denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of
the United States Attorney here. But, each time, it has said
that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of
helpless piety is, I think, undesirable .... If we continue to
do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should
cease to disapprove it.... Government counsel, employing
such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will
Misbehave, 22 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 131 (1986); Martin Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, an
Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REV. 40 (1949); John H. King, Jr., Note, Prosecutorial
Misconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor's Role as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1095 (1980); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 890-902
(1995); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 1083, 1084-86 (1994);
Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLuM. L. REV.
1299 (1996); Richard G. Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How it
Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 (1968); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and
Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1984); Henry B. Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A
Survey of Limitations on a Prosecutor's Closing Argument 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
22 (1973); Welsh S. White, Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 297 (1991); Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic
Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1954); Note, The
Permissible Scope of Summation, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1936).
Commentators on the law of specific states share a similarly disappointed view of
both the behavior of prosecutors and the failure of courts to control it. See, e.g., J. Thomas
Sullivan, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 213 (1998) (Arkansas); Candice D. Tobin, Note and Comment,
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument: Florida Case Law, 22 NOVA L. REV.
485, 510 (1997) (Florida); Peder D. Hong, Summation at the Border: Serious Misconduct in
Final Argument in Criminal Trials, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 43 (1996) (collecting hundreds of
cases of serious misconduct in Minnesota); R. Marc Kantrowitz et al., Closing Arguments:
What Can and Cannot be Said, 81 MASS. L. REV. 95, 107 (1996) (sharply critical of
prosecutors and defense attorneys in Massachusetts); Michael J. Ahlen, The Need for Closing
Argument Guidelines In Jury Trials, 70 N.D. L. REV. 95 (1994) (observing that procedures
make it difficult to obtain ruling on merits in North Dakota); David E. Overby, Improper
Prosecutorial Argument in Capital Cases, 58 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 651 (1990) (Missouri).
But see James W. Gunson, Comment, Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between
"Personal Opinion" and Proper Argument, 46 ME. L. REV. 241 (1994) (criticizing the Law
Court in Maine for venting frustrations with continued misconduct by prosecutors by
reversing three convictions in which the arguments were proper).
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gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking.
The practice of this court-recalling the bitter tear shed by
the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a deplorably
cynical attitude towards the judiciary.5
Despite long-standing and widespread dissatisfaction, there
does not seem to be any substantial change in the perception of the
performance of prosecutors or courts. The volume of reported
appellate cases of misconduct in argument remains high; there are
frequent findings of improper argument, but only occasional
reversals;6 and the volume of scholarly criticism is, if anything,
increasing.
The history of "helpless piety" has produced an air of
resignation among the defense bar' and many commentators,8 with
5. Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d at 661 (Frank, J., dissenting).
6. No overall calculation of reversal rates has been done in this article. However, the
experience of the First Circuit in dealing with the Office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Puerto Rico between 1987 and the present (discussed infra in section III) provides
one piece of evidence. Over this twelve-year period, the First Circuit found twenty-five
instances of improper argument by prosecutors in this office and reversed three times-a
reversal rate of 12% once the court found impropriety.
In a study of 700 criminal and cases, Professor J. Alexander Tanford found an overall
reversal rate of 24% for all cases and 19% for criminal cases. See J. Alexander Tanford,
Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 137 n,406 (Summer 1986).
Professor Tanford contends that the evidence does not support claims that appellate courts
take violations of the rules of closing argument less seriously than other errors. Id. at 137. The
overall reversal rate calculated by Professor Tanford seems rather high and his methodology
is not sufficiently explained to evaluate it. A true overall reversal rate would include cases of
alleged error where the court found no improper conduct and those cases where it found the
error was not properly preserved. A rate calculated with these inclusions would presumably
be lower. In any case, the issue is not whether courts take intentional misbehavior less
seriously than other errors. The question is whether they are focusing on the threats to the
integrity of the system posed by intentional wrongdoing by trusted law enforcement officials.
This raises concerns much more serious than many other kinds of errors.
7. For example, this author was told repeatedly by colleagues in the defense bar over the
nine-year period in which he represented Shawn Hill not to expect relief from the California
Supreme Court even if the prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant. This author was even
advised to limit oral argument on this issue because of the unlikelihood of success. The
pessimism was well founded; before the Hill case, the California Supreme Court had gone 14
years without reversing a case for prosecutorial misconduct. See People v. Holt, 690 P.2d
1207 (Cal. 1984).
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.21 cmt.
(1985) ("From a pragmatic perspective, counsel must consider the plight of the trial judge
having to deal with a rambunctious prosecutor in the midst of a heated murder trial. The
moment the assistant prosecutor is held in contempt, his boss will be in the appellate court
asking for and probably obtaining a stay order and meeting the press to castigate the judge for
interfering with a dedicated prosecutor trying to "put away two ruthless killers."); Gershman,
The New Prosecutors, supra note 4, at 453-55 (suggesting creation of a commission separate
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concerns raised about whether appellate courts care about
misconduct by prosecutors.9 However, the California Supreme
Court's recent dramatic reversal in People v. Hill'° and a review of
the forty-five reversals by federal courts of appeals in the last
decade in cases involving improper prosecutorial argument
demonstrate that many courts that routinely review the work
product of the criminal justice system care deeply about
wrongdoing by prosecutors. Some courts are willing to take strong
measures, including reversals and, in Hill, even a disciplinary
referral to the State Bar," but they lack a coherent rationale and
consistent doctrinal vocabulary for articulating their concerns
about intentional wrongdoing by prosecutors.
In particular, this article examines the curious role that the
prosecutor's intent plays in these decisions. Despite the
widespread perception that the prosecutor's intent is essentially
irrelevant to the decision to reverse,"2 twenty-eight of the forty-five
federal opinions and Hill use language suggesting that the
prosecutor knew that the conduct was improper; in thirteen other
opinions the conduct was such that the prosecutor knew or should
have known it was wrong. When misconduct is the product of
intentional or deliberate behavior, it presents a threat to the
integrity of the criminal justice system. Reading these opinions
from courts to regulate prosecutors because of the failure of courts and disciplinary authorities
to do so); Meares, supra note 4, at 890-92 (suggesting compensating prosecutors for not
engaging in misconduct because efforts to discipline them have failed).
9. See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 675 (arguing that the "key to the problem lies with the
appellate courts," and that "[i]f appellate judges would consistently demand careful and
dignified trial procedures as a prerequisites to criminal conviction, their concern would be
effectively communicated to the trial courts"); Nidry, supra note 4, at 1299 (arguing that
although action by trial courts is certainly needed, present studies suggest that it will take
more leadership by appellate courts to change prosecutors' behavior).
10. 952 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1998).
11. Id. at 703; see BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.1, n.4
(" Literally hundreds of truly egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct have been noted
in this book. To my knowledge, none of these cases resulted in punishment of the prosecutor
by his superiors to say nothing of punishment by courts or bar associations."); Alschuler,
supra note 4, at 644-77; Meares, supra note 4, at 853, 890-91 (suggesting that sanctions are so
ineffective, financial compensation for good behavior should instead be used as a means of
reducing misconduct); Singer, supra note 4, at 272-79; Steele, supra note 4, at 966-67; Note,
Misconduct of Judges and Attorneys During Trial: Informal Sanctions, 49 IOWA L. REV. 541,
543 (1964); Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 4, at
976-83.
12. See, e.g., Gershman, The New Prosecutors, supra note 4, at 440 ("The prosecutor's
motive to unfairly prejudice a defendant is ordinarily not relevant.").
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makes it clear that many courts are deeply concerned when
prosecutors-law enforcement officials whose role is not merely
to secure convictions, but to assure that justice is done-
intentionally violate the law in order to secure convictions. Yet,
current doctrine clouds the power of federal courts to consider
intent in deciding whether to reverse. This leaves an undesirable
separation between doctrine and the considerations that actually
motivate courts to reverse.
This article is the first of a two-part series. This first part is a
report on improper prosecutorial argument in the 1990s,
examining the California Supreme Court's recent reversal of a
murder conviction and death sentence primarily because of
pervasive prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and
the forty-five opinions of federal appellate courts issued since
December 31, 1989 in which a conviction has been overturned and
improper prosecutorial argument was a principal, contributing, or
alternate ground for the decision.'3 The report describes the nature
13. By circuit, these cases are:
First Circuit: United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997); United States
v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir.
1994); United States v. Udechukwu, II F.3d 1101 (1st Cir. 1993); Arrieta-Agressot v.
United States, 3 F.3d 525 (lst Cir. 1993).
Second Circuit: Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1990); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1990).
Third Circuit: United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996); Lesko
v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991).
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Mitchell, I F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993).
Fifth Circuit: United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 393-402 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
Sixth Circuit: Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1994); Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146
(6th Cir. 1991); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1990).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996); Freeman v.
Lane, 962 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1992).
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996); Miller v.
Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1434 n.10 (8th Cir. 1991).
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466 (9th
Cir. 1993) (reversal based on improper questioning of defendant regarding post-arrest
silence; reference to silence in closing argument cured by admonition following timely
objection); Commonwealth v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other
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of the arguments that were found improper in these cases and the
confused state of doctrine concerning whether these improprieties
required reversal. The report concludes with a case study of the
office of the United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico,
which squarely raises the problem of "prosecutorial
recidivism" -the tendency of the same prosecutor or office to
engage in misconduct repeatedly, even in the face of
admonishments from the court.
The second article in this two-part series 4 proposes changes
in doctrine and practice that would allow the intent of the
prosecutor, evident either by the improper argument in a single
case or by a pattern of repeated misconduct, to play an appropriate
role in appellate decision-making and also provide an appropriate
basis for regulating the conduct of prosecutors to reduce or
eliminate misconduct.
I. THE ROLE OF INTENT IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT
A. People v. Hill
In People v. Hill,5 a unanimous California Supreme Court
reversed a death penalty conviction for one count of murder, one
count of attempted murder and three counts of robbery aggravated
by the use of a deadly weapon, primarily because of "the
outrageous and pervasive misconduct on the part of the state's
grounds by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kerr, 981
F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown v.
Borg, 951 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1991).
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1990) (misconduct
during opening statement); Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990).
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11 th Cir. 1995); Davis v.
Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir.
1994) (misconduct during opening statement); United States v. Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557 (11 th
Cir. 1994); Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1993); Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d
1524 (11 th Cir.1992).
D.C. Circuit: United States. v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States
v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
14. Appearing in a forthcoming issue of The Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process.
15. 952 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1998).
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representative at trial: the public prosecutor" in arguments to the
jury and behavior during the trial.16 The court found that this
pervasive prosecutorial misconduct, together with other errors by
the trial court,'7 constituted cumulative error that "created a
negative synergistic effect, rendering the degree of overall
unfairness to defendant more than that flowing from the sum of
the individual errors." 8 In deciding to reverse, the court found that
"defendant was deprived of that which the state was
constitutionally required to provide and he was entitled to receive:
a fair trial," '9 without formally considering whether the strength of
the evidence against Hill was strong enough to render the errors it
found harmless. Chief Justice George concurred on the ground
that the pervasive misconduct combined with the erroneous
rulings of the trial court on that misconduct was sufficient by itself
to justify reversal. °
1. Hill Prosecutor's History of Misconduct
Prior to the trial in Hill, the prosecutor's practice of
misconduct at trial had been documented in three appellate court
decisions. In 1974, in People v. Mendoza,2 the court cited four
separate instances of misconduct by her as grounds for reversing a
conviction for child molestation. Without mentioning her by
name, the court found that the prosecutor's closing argument was
improper because it made thinly veiled references to defendant's
failure to testify;22 made unjustified inferences and dwelt on
16. Id. at 679.
17. These included: (1) allowing defendant to be shackled throughout the trial without
determining for itself whether shackling was necessary, (2) not excusing the bailiff from
further courtroom duties after he testified against defendant, (3) failing to instruct the jury to
consider the testimony of the bailiff as it would any other witness, and (4) instructing the jury
that it need not find defendant intended to kill to sustain the robbery-murder-special-
circumstance allegation. Id. at 681.
18. Id. at 699.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 703.
21. 37 Cal. App. 3d 717, 726-27 (Ct. App. 1974).
22. "[T]his is a serious offense; you should give it great, great thought. Since olden
days, I guess it is from the time when the defendant was not capable of taking the stand,
you know, he couldn't be a witness in those days, there is a cautionary instruction that says
to you, 'The charge is easily made; hard to defend against.' " Id. at 726.
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suppositions not reflected in evidence;" misstated the law;24 and
urged the jury to "take... [defendant] off the streets.""
Three years later, in People v. Kelley,26 the same prosecutor
was involved in a rancorous trial in which she was cited by an
appellate court for eighteen separate instances of misconduct.
These included making personally abusive statements in front of
the jury to and about opposing counsel; threatening opposing
counsel;27 unjustifiably moving that opposing counsel be cited for
misconduct; refusing, without apparent basis, to stipulate to
undisputed facts; using "dirty glares" and "sinister looks" to
suggest to the jury that opposing counsel were doing something
wrong;28 and engaging in such heated exchanges with opposing
counsel that the court twice adjourned early to avoid dealing with
the unpleasantness. Despite all of this misconduct, the Kelley court
did not reverse because the evidence against defendant was strong
23. The prosecutor argued:
It is the very little, small, mild people, some of whom, rather than even being
prosecuted, go to psychiatric care, who maybe ultimately molest, sexually
attack, and even kill their granddaughters, friends who come to the house to see
them, or the child is found in Griffith Park. These are things that happen all the
time.... There are more, many more articles in newspapers; you have all read
them, that say 'Hey, you know, we didn't think this guy was too dangerous. He
looked kind of meek.' And we don't know how fragile Mr. Mendoza is. There is
no evidence as to how fragile he is, but he looked sort of meek. We didn't really
know; we didn't really realize, and this is after death and worse that leaves
injury on these kids.
Id. at 726.
24. A "child molestation case, that is 288 of the Penal Code, requires very little
evidence." Id. at 727.
25. Id.
26. 75 Cal. App. 3d 672, 680-91 (Ct. App. 1977).
27. Id. at 681-82. These included: "Excuse me, if you interrupt me again, I'm going to
kick you in the ankle." Id. As described by the court:
The deputy district attorney, in objecting on the ground of relevancy to a
particular line of cross-examination by deputy public defender Nierenberg,
stated that when the time came the deputy public defender wanted to go on
vacation she was not going to speed up the process of putting on relevant
evidence.
THE COURT: We don't need threats being made here as to what you are
going to do.
[THE PROSECUTOR:] I know, but I just-
THE COURT: Will you please let me finish, for a change?
[THE PROSECUTOR:] All right.
Id.
28. See id. at 683-84.
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and "prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice appellant's case,
but to the contrary may have helped it by generating jury
sympathy to produce a hung jury on nine of twelve counts."29
Although the court reminded her of her responsibilities as a public
prosecutor and found that she had committed extensive
misconduct, the opinion did not mention the prosecutor by name.
The court did, however, name her opposing counsel whose
demeanor it also criticized. No professional discipline of either
attorney was mentioned.
Then, in an unpublished opinion filed in December of 1987,' o
just a few months before the trial in Hill began, the California
Court of Appeals found it necessary to admonish the prosecutor by
name for her misconduct:
Although we have determined the denial of appellant's
right of confrontation was sufficiently egregious in itself to
require reversal, we nevertheless feel compelled to
comment upon the conduct of the deputy district attorney.
This court has had occasion to twice address at length her
attitude toward, and treatment of, the judge, opposing
counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the
courtroom [citing Kelley and Mendoza].
Consequently, it is disheartening, to say the least, to learn
that she takes "pride" in our admonitions, apparently
because we did not reverse the judgment rendered. We
most earnestly urge counsel to reconsider her approach lest
in the future it becomes necessary for us to reverse
otherwise sustainable convictions because, in view of her
declaration here, further instances of objectionable
behavior could be regarded as premeditated. We suggest
that she reflect on the possibility that others, even opposing
counsel and members of the judiciary, are also striving as
sincerely as is she, to serve the law to the best of our mere
mortal abilities."
Thus, the court warned the prosecutor that repetitions of her
conduct could result in reversals in the future, mentioned her by
name, condemned her behavior in strong terms, and even pleaded
29. Kelly, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 690.
30. People v. Congious, No. B020979, 2d Dist., Div. 2 (December 4, 1987) (unpublished
opinion).
31. Id.
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with her to reform her conduct. It did not, however, order or
recommend any discipline, such as a fine, suspension, or
disbarment.
2. The Hill Trial
The unpublished opinion in Congious was issued in
December of 1987, during pretrial proceedings in Hill. Despite the
strong rebuke from the appellate court, the prosecutor was allowed
to continue to try a death penalty case. If her supervisors believed
that the most recent stinging rebuke from the appellate court
would rein in this prosecutor, they were mistaken. The opinion
describing the prosecutor's conduct during the Hill trial reads like
a manual on conduct a prosecutor should avoid. Specifically, the
California Supreme Court found that the prosecutor engaged in the
following improper conduct:
(a) Misstating evidence. The Court found that the
prosecutor seriously distorted evidence in her closing arguments
at both the guilt and penalty phases in the following ways:
i. Distorting crucial blood evidence. During the guilt
phase, the prosecutor argued to the jury that blood evidence on a
knife allegedly the murder weapon was "classified down, right
down to the different classifications as" the murder victim's
blood, when in fact the serologist had only been able to classify
the blood as type 0, a blood grouping possessed by forty-eight
percent of the population." When defense counsel objected that
the prosecutor had confused the blood evidence relating to the
murder with the blood evidence relating to an attempted murder
of a different victim on a different day (blood evidence that had
32. Subsequent to the decision in Hill, a magistrate found that this same prosecutor had
deliberately caused a mistrial to try and obtain a more favorable ruling on the admissibility
of evidence. The magistrate found that the prosecutor was "a loose cannon" who "the
District Attorney cannot or will not control," and whose "course of conduct has made her
a local legend in her own time." Mercado v. Block, No. CV89-0408-PAR(B) (May 1,
1989) (report and recommendations of magistrate) (on file with author). In addition, the
magistrate recommended that the district court refer the prosecutor to the local bar. Id. The
magistrate's recommendations were not followed by the district judge. See Mercado v.
Block, 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
33. People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 685 (Cal. 1998).
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received much more sophisticated enzyme testing and that had
been identified as a rare type of AB blood possessed by only
four people out of 100,000), the trial judge overruled the
objection and prosecutor continued to argue her totally
misleading statement of the blood evidence.
3 4
ii. Misrepresenting eyewitness testimony. The
prosecutor's closing argument in the guilt phase blatantly denied
that an eyewitness had testified that the perpetrator the witness
saw was no more than five-foot-five inches tall when the witness
had clearly testified to this fact (defendant was five foot ten
inches tall).35
iii. Falsely characterizing a surgical scar as a knife
wound. During the trial, the prosecutor had asked the attempted
murder victim, Ron Johnson, to display a ten-inch scar on his
chest to the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
You saw the scar. Take a look at it, and you will remember
how far across the chest it went. If you stick it in him two
36times and rip his chest open, you are planning to kill him.
Even when defense counsel, in his closing, asked the jury to
look at the hospital records that demonstrated that Johnson's
wound was two centimeters in length and that the ten-inch scar on
his chest was caused by surgery, the prosecutor stuck to her guns,
telling the jury in her rebuttal argument:
You will also see that his scar was not by reason of a doctor
cutting him from side to top. The lawyer that had that
malpractice action would be doing a pretty good job. He
would make quite a few bucks. That was a terrible scar."
In fact, the hospital records did confirm that on entry to the
hospital, the larger of Johnson's wounds was two centimeters in
length, as defense counsel had stated.3
34. Id.
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(b) Referring to facts not in evidence. The prosecutor often
referred to facts not in evidence, including suggestions in guilt-
phase closing argument (without evidence in the record to
support the argument) that no similar crimes had been
committed in that location since defendant was arrested. She
stated that she could have produced an expert to testify that the
substance found in murder victim Margetts' truck was fake rock
cocaine after defense counsel had argued that her failure to do so
created reasonable doubt. She also argued without evidence that
a defense witness, Delores Smith, who testified that she saw the
events preceding the murder from the apartment window of her
friend Linda Hill, was biased because Ms. Hill had the same last
name as the defendant and was therefore probably a relative of
defendant.39 The pattern continued during the penalty phase
arguments in which the prosecutor argued to the jury that
defendant called his knives his "uzis" (a type of assault rifle)
even though she had been unable to get a prosecution witness to
so testify. ° In the penalty phase, she also argued that
everything [defendant] ever did one way or another, he got
away with. He has killed. He has stabbed. He has robbed.
He has gone to prison for it. He has not been rehabilitated
under any guise or thought.4'
In fact, defendant's prior convictions did not involve
homicide, stabbings of any kind, or robbery.42 She also argued
without any evidence in the record what prison conditions are like,
what defense lawyers always argue, and that "some people in state
prison can, I guess, be rehabilitated. I haven't seen too many, and I
have been around a lot." 
4 3
(c) Misstating the law. The prosecutor also argued in the
guilt phase that if they believed defense counsel's argument that
there was reasonable doubt about the perpetrator's intent prior to
the stabbing, the jurors would "have to walk that murderer, that
robber out of the courtroom." Actually, defense counsel's
39. Id. at 688.
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argument went to the degree of murder and even if accepted
would have resulted in a conviction for second degree murder,
not acquittal.
When confronted with a defense contention that defendant
committed a theft, not a robbery, the prosecutor argued that
"pretend[ing] to sell them something in order to get money.., is
robbery." The court found that this argument "subtly
undermin[ed]" the force or fear element of robbery. The
prosecutor further argued that "there has to be some evidence on
which to base a doubt" in response to defense arguments that the
prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt."
(d) Making rude and derisive comments about opposing
counsel in front of the jury. The court's opinion noted the
following instances of such misconduct during the guilt phase:
(i) a retort in response to a request to stipulate that the length of
the jury box was twenty feet; the prosecutor replied "I certainly
will not," followed by a statement in front of the jury that
defense counsel was "unprofessional" and "contemptuous" for
even asking her to stipulate; (ii) an outburst in front of the jury
in response to defense counsel's cross examination of the
prosecution's fingerprint expert on whether mistakes were ever
made in identifying fingerprints, in which the prosecutor
demanded that defendant's prints be rolled in front of the jury
and signed by defense counsel; (iii) audibly laughing during
defense counsel's examination of witnesses; (iv) getting out of
her chair during defense counsel's examination of witnesses,
standing in his line of sight, staring at him and making faces at
him.45 In addition, the court described her behavior during the
penalty phase as follows:
When defense counsel interjected that he could not hear
[the prosecutor's] closing argument, she cracked: "Is it all
right if I continue whether or not he hears?" When defense
counsel stated the court had ruled a defense penalty phase
witness should be allowed to see the medical records from
a hospital, [the prosecutor] replied: "No. The court didn't.
44. Id. at 689.
45. Id. at 690-91.
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And I don't pay attention to you." Twice during bench
conferences, defense counsel asked [the prosecutor] to keep
her voice down so the jury would not hear their discussion.
[The prosecutor] expressed indignation and refused in both
46instances to agree to lower her voice.
(e) Intimidating defense witnesses. The court was
concerned with the prosecutor threatening defense witness
Reginald Berry with a perjury prosecution if he testified
differently from his statements to the police. (Berry in fact
testified at trial that he was at the scene moments before the
murder and that defendant was not the man attempting to sell
drugs to the victim just before the stabbing.)47
3. The Relevance of the Prosecutor's Intent in Hill
During oral argument in Hill before the California Court of
Appeals, this author was asked whether it was "necessary" for the
court to take judicial notice of the appellate opinions citing the
prosecutor for her misconduct in the past. That question provided
the genesis of this article. In one sense, the question asked whether
the misconduct of the prosecutor in this case was sufficient by
itself to warrant reversal without considering her past record. But
in a larger sense, it asked whether evidence that the prosecutor had
in other cases prior to the present case deliberately engaged in
misconduct at trial and in closing argument was relevant to the
court's decision to reverse the conviction in Hill. To be relevant,
the prosecutor's intent in the Hill trial would have to be relevant.
The court really never answered its own question. On the one
hand, the opinion stated that cases that "hold or suggest a showing
of bad faith is required to establish prosecutorial misconduct in
argument to the jury... are inconsistent with Bolton and its
progeny and are overruled," 4 and suggested replacement of the
term "prosecutorial misconduct" with the term "prosecutorial
error." This was a strong indication that the court thought the
46. Id. at 694.
47. Id. at691.
48. Hill, 952 P.2d at 684 n. I (citing People v. Bolton, 589 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1979)).
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prosecutor's intentions were irrelevant in determining the
propriety of the prosecutor's conduct.49
On the other hand, the court clearly indicated it found that the
prosecutor's methods were deceptive and reprehensible5 0 and that
her behavior, "at times childish and unprofessional and at other
times outrageous and unethical, betrayed her trust as a public
prosecutor."5' It chastised her throughout the opinion, criticizing
her by name over 120 times, and reported her to the State Bar for
consideration of disciplinary proceedings." More importantly, the
court took judicial notice of the prosecutor's three prior citations
for misconduct, noting that it was addressing "an institutional
concern as well":
We are confident the prosecutors of this state need no
reminder of the high standard to which they are held, and
that the rule prohibiting reversals for prosecutorial
misconduct absent a miscarriage of justice in no way
authorizes or justifies the type of misconduct that occurred
in this case.
Other than this language, the court in no way explained in its
decision what relevance the prosecutor's past misconduct had to
its reversal. Despite the court's expression of confidence that
prosecutors did not need a "reminder" that there are enforceable
limits on their conduct, the statement itself suggests that the court
thought otherwise. Such a reminder is, of course, an
acknowledgement of the conscious, intentional choices that
prosecutors make whenever they argue to the jury, and an
expression of the court's concern that prosecutors might take the
cynical attitude that because reversals are rare, they are free to
engage in argument that violates established standards.54
49. Indeed, the court quoted Bolton, which had in turn quoted an influential student note
for the proposition that "this emphasis on intentionality is misplaced. '[I]njury to appellant is
nonetheless an injury because it was committed inadvertently rather than intentionally.' "
Hill, 952 P.2d at 683-84 (quoting Bolton, 589 P.2d at 398, which in turn quoted Note, The
Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54
COLuM. L. REv. 946,975 (1954)).
50. Hill, 952 P.2d at 698.
51. Id.
52. Id. at703 n.13.
53. Id. at 699-700.
54. Taking judicial notice of her past behavior may also have been relevant to provide a
context in which to place her behavior. For example, claims of dirty glares and stares may not
sound credible unless you know that the prosecutor has been cited for such conduct before.
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B. United States Supreme Court Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court has also taken a somewhat
inconsistent approach to prosecutorial intent. Although there are
indications in some of its prosecutorial misconduct decisions that
the prosecutor's intent was a factor in its analysis,5 the Court has
only once spoken directly to the role of intent in deciding whether
prosecutorial arguments to the jury are either error or prejudicial.
In Miller v. Pate,56 the Court held that the knowing use of false
evidence violates due process, without much explanation as to
why the prosecutor's knowing use or intent was significant.
In the related context of disclosing exculpatory evidence to
the defense under Brady v. Maryland, however, the Court has
been emphatic that the "touchstone of due process analysis in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the
trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor,"58 and that "[i]f the
suppression of the evidence results in constitutional error, it is
because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
prosecutor."59 This language certainly suggests an antipathy to
considering intent, but it reflects decisions on disclosure cases that
are not directly on point. Even in the disclosure cases, however,
the fact that the prosecutor's use of false evidence was knowing
makes the standard of materiality of the evidence easier for the
defense to meet.6°
Moreover, her past conduct may have been relevant to the court's decision to refer her for
discipline.
55. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("as much prosecutor's duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one") (emphasis added).
56. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
58. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218 (1982).
59. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (footnote and citation omitted);
Smith, 455 U.S. at 219 n.10 and accompanying text (1982).
60. Compare Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (holding that where use of false evidence is
knowing, it is material and grounds for reversal "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury"); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (similar); and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) (similar) with
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that in the absence of evidence
that the prosecutor knew or learned that evidence introduced was false, the failure to disclose
evidence is material and grounds for reversal only "if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different").
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Both the California Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court are clearly correct that prosecutorial conduct that
prejudices the defense should result in reversal regardless of what
the prosecutor intended and that, as the California Supreme Court
has suggested, in such situations appellate courts should focus on
the effect of the argument and not require any showing of bad faith
on the part of the prosecutor.61 It does not follow, however, that the
intention of the prosecutor is irrelevant to determinations of
whether reversible error has occurred.
Intentional wrongdoing in court by perhaps the most critical
member of the government law enforcement team calls into
question the fairness and integrity of the trial and cries out for
effective judicial supervisory action to prevent or deter such
behavior. The United States Supreme Court, however, has limited
the power of the federal courts of appeals to do so in three separate
ways. First, the Court has ruled that whatever power federal courts
have on direct appeal to regulate the conduct of trials occurring in
federal court, they have no such supervisory power in habeas
62
corpus proceedings challenging the state convictions.
Second, United States v. Hasting63 made clear that even on
direct appeal the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals are
limited; it held that reversals are appropriate only after harmless
error review is conducted and results in a conclusion that the error
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This holding could
make the supervisory power to reverse in order to deter future
misconduct superfluous: if an error is prejudicial, then there is no
need to invoke the supervisory power to justify reversal; if the
error is harmless, then Hasting suggests there is no supervisory
power to reverse, at least in cases where it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.64
61. For example, in United States v. Forlonna, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996), the court
reversed a conviction because of the prosecutor's inaccurate claim that clothes in the suitcase
carried by the defendant fit the defendant, even though the court found no evidence the
prosecutor knew his statement was inaccurate. The court reversed because "the prejudicial
effect on the jury of a misleading argument is equally great regardless whether the attorney
knows it is baseless." Id. at 95; see also Duane, supra note 4, at 622-23.
62. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (holding that appropriate
standard of review on writ of habeas corpus is "the narrow one of due process, and not the
broad exercise of supervisory power") (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,
642 (1974)).
63. 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983).
64. But cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993) (stating court "does not
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The third way in which the Court has limited the lower
courts' power to use reversal to enforce their own rules is by
limiting plain error review. In United States v. Young,65 the Tenth
Circuit, two to one, reversed a fraud conviction for plain error
when the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of government
witnesses in response to improper defense argument because "the
rule is clear in this Circuit that improper conduct on the part of
opposing counsel should be met with an objection to the court, not
a similarly improper response., 66 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that plain error doctrine should be reserved for
"particularly egregious errors" that "seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."67 Although
it agreed with the lower court that the prosecutor's remarks were
improper and constituted error, it ruled that the lower court had
erred in failing to evaluate that error by viewing it "against the
entire record. 68 More important for present purposes than the
reasons for its conclusion that the errors did not "undermine the
fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of
justice,, 69 is the clear message of Young that the lower courts
should not exercise their power to recognize plain error solely in
order to enforce compliance with their own rules. As in Hasting,
the Court required actual prejudice to the defendant to justify a
reversal.
II. FEDERAL REVERSALS IN THE 1990s
Given the limitations on the lower courts set by the Supreme
Court decisions upholding convictions against claims of
prosecutorial misconduct, it is a wonder that appellate courts
reverse on these grounds at all. Since 1990, however, federal
foreclose the possibility that in an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of
the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so
infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did not
substantially influence the jury's verdict"). In a subsequent article, the author argues that the
direct appeal doctrine after Hasting still leaves room for reversals that take account of
intentional misconduct and the need to deter it.
65. 736 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
66. Young, 736 F.2d at 570.
67. Young, 470 U.S. at 15.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id.
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courts of appeal have overturned convictions in at least forty-five
cases in which improper prosecutorial argument was the sole
ground, an alternate ground, or a ground contributing to a
cumulative error reversal. The cases include reversals on direct
appeal of federal convictions and cases where federal post-
conviction relief was granted in whole or in part.
Three things are striking about these reversals. First, there
was relative unanimity in the decisions; only five of the decisions
drew a dissento and only two a concurrence.71 Thus, 129 of the
135 judges who heard these cases were in agreement on the
impropriety of the prosecutor's conduct, the necessity for reversal,
and the rationale for reversal. On the issue of propriety of the
conduct challenged, there was only a single dissent.7 2 Second, the
doctrine guiding the courts' decisions is extraordinarily complex
and courts have had great difficulty articulating clear rationales
and standards governing the evaluation of the improper conduct
and the role of the prosecutor's intent within that process.
Although the intentional nature of the misconduct seems to
influence courts to reverse, the doctrinal basis for such
consideration is cloudy at best. Third, in not one of these cases did
the court take the step of ordering that a prosecutor be disciplined
for the conduct.
A. Prosecutorial Arguments That are Improper
The first step in evaluating a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct in argument is to determine whether the argument
violates established rules of proper argument. Those established
rules have evolved from and been influenced by common law
principles, professional standards, ethical standards and
constitutional requirements. In finding arguments improper, the
forty-five appellate reversals broke virtually no new ground. The
only true question of first impression arose in Agard v.
70. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 716-21 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnston,
127 F.3d 380, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1997); Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 790-95 (6th Cir. 1996);
Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir. 1993); Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469,
474-76 (10th Cir. 1990).
71. See United States v. Payne,.2 F.3d 706, 716 (6th Cir. 1993); Agard, 117 F.3d at 715-
16.
72. Agard, 117 F.3d at 716-21.
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Portuondo,73 in which a divided Second Circuit held that it
violated the Confrontation Clause for a prosecutor to argue that the
defendant in a rape case was the only witness who got to listen to
the other witnesses and therefore could fabricate his testimony to
match theirs. Agard was, in fact, the only case of the forty-five in
which there was a disagreement over whether the conduct was
improper. Only three other cases involved prosecutorial
misconduct that was arguably not covered by a specific holding
that the particular form of argument was improper.74 The other
forty-one reversals relied on well-settled principles of argument
and constitutional law. Thus, it appears that in forty-one of the
forty-five reversals, prosecutors should have known their
arguments were improper.
The specific arguments that federal courts have both held
improper and found resulted in reversible error are discussed
below. They are grouped in two categories: violations of basic
principles of argument and violations of constitutional protections.
1. Violations of basic rules of proper argument
The standards for proper argument begin with the basic
concept that closing argument is an opportunity for the parties to
present their view of the appropriate inferences to be drawn from
the evidence: "The most elementary rule governing the limits of
argument is that it must be confined to the record evidence and the
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it." 75 Departures
from appropriate, acceptable argument therefore include: (1)
referring to matters not in evidence; (2) referring to evidence
73. Id.
74. Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding that reading capital jury a
portion of state supreme court opinion urging no mercy for murderers violated Eighth
Amendment); Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524 (1Ilth Cir. 1992) (same); Lesko v. Lehman, 925
F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that comment at penalty phase that defendant, who testified
at the penalty phase, did not say he was sorry violated Fifth Amendment rights).
75. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-5.8, cmt. at 107 (1993).
76. See United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal
of drug conviction because prosecutor's argument that government agent who did not testify
would have given inculpatory testimony and improper vouching for credibility of government
agent who did testify violated confrontation clause and constituted constitutional error that
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Miller v. Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995)
(death penalty conviction unanimously overturned on habeas because of racial discrimination
in jury selection, but court goes on to rule that closing argument in penalty phase was due
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excluded by the court;77 (3) "vouching" by either improperlyS 71
buttressing the credibility of government witnesses or by giving
personal views on the case;79 (4) distorting the record by misstating
process violation as well because of numerous improper arguments including: (1) with no
evidence of it, that family of victims was waiting for death verdict; (2) cost of incarceration
should not be borne by taxpayers; (3) defendant never said he was sorry; (4) argument with no
evidence that defendant had escaped from prison previously; (5) argument that defendant was
a mad dog who could escape; (6) urging jury not to reach a compromise and give him life
without parole because he could escape); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir.
1994) (unanimous reversal for, among other improper arguments, argument-without
evidence in record to support it--that partial prints on drugs and weapons implicated
defendants); United States v. Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557 (11 th Cir. 1994) (unanimous reversal for
arguing facts not in evidence-that defendant was a professional criminal); United States v.
Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that alternate ground for reversal
was prosecutor's repeated references in closing argument to alleged eye contact between
codefendants at time of arrest-an argument that was not supported by evidence, was clearly
improper, and would merit reversal despite any curative instructions because "phantom
evidence" was a key part of closing argument).
77. See United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal of a
conviction for aggravated sexual assault because of cumulative errors, including the
prosecutor's use during closing argument of testimony previously stricken by the court);
United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (unanimous plain error reversal
and acquittal because of prosecutor's improper reference both in summation and in
questioning of witnesses to excluded post-arrest hearsay statement by son-in-law implicating
his alleged co-conspirator father-in-law where statement was virtually only evidence linking
father-in-law to conspiracy).
78. See United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal for
prosecutor's improper reference to the defendant's failure to testify and for improper
vouching, where the prosecutor told jury that "[p]art of the plea agreement is also that Mr.
Martin testify truthfully," submitted that "he has testified truthfully," and on at least four
other occasions argued that Martin was credible or forthright); United States v. Carroll, 26
F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (unanimous reversal for arguing that plea agreement by government
witness ensured that his testimony was truthful); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 572
(1st Cir. 1994) (unanimous reversal for pervasive misconduct including vouching for
credibility of key government agents by telling jury that government witnesses were "bound
by their oath and the limits of honesty," "bound by the truth," and therefore could not lie);
United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 934 & 936 (9th Cir. 1992) (plain error reversal for
"repeated comments aimed at establishing his own veracity and credibility as a representative
of the government," particularly a comment that "if I did anything wrong in this trial, I
wouldn't be here. The court wouldn't allow that to happen," which "placed the imprimatur of
the judicial system itself on" prosecutor's credibility); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 350-
51, 354 (2d Cir. 1990) (unanimous granting of habeas petition because defendant denied a
fundamentally fair trial by cumulative errors, including prosecutor's improper vouching that
"invited the jury to view its verdict as a vindication of the prosecutor's integrity rather than as
an assessment of guilt or innocence based upon the evidence presented at trial").
79. See United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 1992) (unanimous plain
error reversal where prosecutor asked jury whether they asked if the witnesses were
"hoodwinking me" when he presented their testimony, and also gave his personal opinion of
the credibility of witnesses).
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the evidence ° or by impermissily using evidence properly
presented;s' (5) misstating the law;82 (6) making derisive comments
about opposing counsel in front of the jury;83 and (7) appealing to
passion and prejudice through appeals to racial, ethnic or religious
prejudice;84 war on drugs rhetoric;" the vilification of defendant; 6
and other inflammatory appeals. 7
80. See United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal for
prosecutor's inaccurate statement of evidence concerning the motive of defendant to commit
crime; court also holds that judge's comments to defendant and constant criticism of defense
counsel were reversible); United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (unanimous
reversal because prosecutor repeatedly claimed incorrectly that evidence showed that clothes
found in suitcase carried by defendant fit defendant where defendant claimed he was carrying
case for someone else).
81. See United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (unanimous plain error
reversal for cross-examination and continuing argument that defendant's brother had been
convicted of the same crime and the jury obviously had not believed brother's testimony at
brother's own trial, so this jury should not believe him either, and also that prior conviction of
brother was substantive evidence against defendant, when brother's conviction was admitted
solely for purposes of impeachment).
82. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1997) (unanimous plain
error reversal for cumulative errors, including prosecutor's misstatement of the burden of
proof and government's duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where prosecutor
told jury that when the defense does go forward with evidence, "the defendant has the
same responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a compelling case");
Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990) (2-1 overturning of state conviction
on habeas for prosecutorial misconduct in voir dire and in closing arguments, where
prosecutor stated that presumption of innocence was designed to protect those who were
not guilty and that original presumption of innocence had been removed by the evidence in
this case); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1990) (state conviction unanimously
overturned because of broad range of improper remarks by the prosecutor including
misstatement of law of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
83. See United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1379 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversal for
cumulative error including comments backhandedly complimenting defense counsel on his
skill in confusing the alleged victim of sexual assault when cross-examining her, and
telling the jury that defense counsel will ask the jury to "look at little bits and pieces" of
the evidence, while the government and the judge will ask the jury to consider "all of the
evidence-a "serious misstep" contributing to reversal); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d
667, 671 (6th Cir. 1990) (unanimous overturning of state murder conviction on habeas
where, among other improprieties, prosecutor implied that defendant's attorneys were
helping him to generate an alibi and to "get ... [his] story straight"); United States v.
Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 708 & 709 (2d Cir. 1990) (unanimous reversal where prosecutor
told jury that some people "go out and investigate drug dealers and prosecute" while
"there are others who defend them, try to get them off, perhaps even for high fees"-a
remark that "undermine[d] the presumption of innocence, the Government's obligation to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the standards of propriety applicable to public
prosecutors" ).
84. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (unanimous reversal for
constitutional error when prosecutor made summation referring to Jamaicans taking over
Washington, D.C. drug trade).
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2. Constitutional violations
Arguments improper under the previous standards are
ordinarily considered trial error not amounting to a constitutional
violation. Some improprieties in argument, however, do rise to the
level of constitutional violations. All constitutional violations are
not created equal. The Supreme Court has held that denials of
specific benefits of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel,
or of specific rights, such as the privilege against self
incrimination, are entitled to "special care to assure that
prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them,"
whereas claims that the prosecutor's remarks rendered a trial so
unfair as to violate the due process clause must meet a greater
85. See Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 & 530 (1st Cir. 1993)
(unanimous reversal for plain error when prosecutor used "150-proof' war on drugs rhetoric
in light of two previous decisions condemning such argument); United States v. Johnson, 968
F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1992) (unanimous reversal of drug convictions because of prosecutor's
appeal to jury to be "bulwark" against drug dealing); United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146
(6th Cir. 1991) (unanimous reversal because prosecutor's appeal to community conscience in
context of war on drugs and suggestion that drug problem facing jurors' community would be
increased if they did not convict violated defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial).
86. See United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal
because of argument that twice called defendants "bad people" and made thinly veiled
reference to them not being locals in rebuttal closing argument where objections were
overruled); Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 1993) (state child molestation
conviction overturned on habeas, 2-1, because prosecutor compared defendant to Adolf
Hitler and made repeated references, despite trial judge's warnings, to prior sexual
misconduct by defendant and made racial remarks as well).
87. See United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1993) (unanimous reversal
because prosecutor's references to the plight of poor children, Christmas time, and the GM
layoff were inflammatory and prejudicial in postal employee's trial for obstruction and
desertion of mails); Commonwealth v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 487 (9th Cir. 1993),
overruled on other grounds by George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997)
(unanimous reversal for among other things, prosecutorial misconduct in implicitly
threatening the jury's safety, holding "[tihe prosecutor's suggestions that Mendiola would
walk out of the courtroom right behind them, if acquitted, and presumably retrieve the
missing murder weapon was particularly improper because the prosecutor knew that his
witness, the informer Reyes, was responsible for the missing gun"); United States v.
Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1991) (unanimous reversal because of "government's
attempt to tie Appellant's guilt directly to his association with the Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club constitutes reversible error"); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667, 669 (6th Cir. 1990)
(unanimous overturning of state murder conviction on habeas where prosecutor's
argument, among other improprieties, appealed to class biases against defendant's wealth,
which allowed him to afford seven lawyers).
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burden of fundamental unfairness to establish constitutional
88
error.
The constitutional violations for which federal appellate
courts in the 1990s overturned convictions include: (1)
commenting on accused's failure to testify in violation of Fifth
Amendment rights under Griffin v. California;89 (2) depriving
defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
against him;9° (3) undermining the eighth amendment right to a
reliable death verdict;" and (4) denying due process rights by
88. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 193 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
89. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Cases finding Griffin violations include United States v.
Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 393-98, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1997) (2-1 reversal of conviction of one
defendant in multi-defendant trial because (1) closing argument telling jury not to consider
defendants' silence was intended to call attention to defendants' failure to testify and (2)
deliberate questioning was designed to bring out inadmissible hearsay prejudicial to that
defendant); United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (unanimous plain error
reversal for cumulative errors including prosecutor's comments to jury that they should not
take into consideration in any way the fact that defendant did not testify, when the court
saw this as a deliberate attempt to call attention to defendant's failure to testify); United
States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal for cumulative
error, including prosecutor's improper comment on defendant's failure to testify by arguing
repeatedly that government evidence was uncontroverted and reminding jury that
defendant "doesn't have to put evidence on"); United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753 (1st
Cir. 1994) (unanimous reversal for indirectly commenting on defendant's failure to testify
where prosecutor argued that defendant was "still running and hiding" during trial);
Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1992) (unanimous overturning of state
conviction on habeas for repeated remarks that evidence was "unrebutted and
uncontradicted"); see also Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991) (closing
argument in penalty phase of death case that defendant should be executed because he
failed to say he was sorry for the crime when he testified at the penalty phase violated his
Fifth Amendment right not to testify against himself; this, combined with an argument that
the jury should show defendant the same mercy as he showed his victims, resulted in the
granting of habeas corpus relief); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 351, 353-54 (2d Cir.
1990) (prosecutor juxtaposed "Fifth Amendment burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" with the argument that "if there was confusion in this case, from whence did that
come?"; court found these references to the Fifth Amendment "puzzling," and that in
context the references "could well have been interpreted by the jury as comment on
Floyd's failure to testify").
90. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 706-14 (2d Cir. 1997) (2-1 decision overturning
state rape conviction on habeas where prosecutor argued in summation that only defendant
had opportunity to listen to other witnesses and therefore fabricate his testimony; this
violated his right to confrontation, penalizing him for exercising his right to be present at
trial, his right to testify and his right to due process); United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96
F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996) (unanimous reversal where prosecutor's argument that a
government agent who did not testify would corroborate what the agent who did testify
violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him).
91. See Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (unanimous overturning of state
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making arguments known to be false;92 (5) undermining the
presumption of innocence or burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt;93 (6) arguing that post-Miranda silence impeaches a
defendant who has testified, a violation of due process under
Doyle v. Ohio;94 (7) appealing to racial or ethnic prejudice; 95 and
(8) engaging in what would normally be non-constitutional error,
but in a manner so prejudicial that it denies the general right to due
96process.
death sentence on habeas where prosecutor read quote from state supreme court opinion
arguing against mercy for murderers); Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524 (1lth Cir. 1992)
(same).
92. See United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 296-302 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315
(9th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. In two of the cases discussed above under misstatements of law, supra note 83, the
misstatements were concerning the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence. See Mahomey v. Wallman, 917 F.2d
469 (10th Cir. 1990) (2-1 overturning of state conviction on habeas for prosecutorial
statements in voir dire and closing arguments that presumption of innocence was designed to
protect those who were not guilty and that original presumption of innocence had been
removed by the evidence in this case); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1990)
(State conviction unanimously overturned because of broad range of improper remarks by the
prosecutor, including comment that "[t]he burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a
shield for the innocent ... not a barrier to conviction for the guilty." ).
94. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Cases finding Doyle error in argument include Gravley v. Mills,
87 F.3d 779, 782 (6th Cir. 1996) (2-1 overturning of state conviction on habeas because of
prosecutor's repeated references to post-Miranda in cross-examination of defendant and in
closing argument); United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1993) (unanimous
reversal for Doyle violation in cross-examining defendant about post-Miranda silence on
claim that she participated in drug manufacture under duress; her silence also mentioned in
closing argument).
95. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (comments that
Jamaicans are taking over the city were constitutional violation because "racial fairness of
the trial is an indispensable ingredient of due process").
96. See Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 1993) (cumulative errors in comparing
defendant to Adolph Hitler, referring, in violation of a pretrial court order, to other alleged
molestations by defendant, and other improper conduct denied defendant due process right to
a fair trial); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1990) (due process violation
in the combination of repeated appeals to class bias and the suggestion that defendant's high
priced lawyers were helping him to concoct an alibi); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 714
(6th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's repeated remarks were "part of a calculated effort used to evoke
strong sympathetic emotions for Christmas-time activity, the poor, pregnant women,
diaperless children and laid-off employees" so serious as to deny defendant's constitutional
rights, presumably to a fundamentally fair trial); United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir. 1992) (single set of remarks inviting jury to act as a "bulwark" against drugs denied
constitutional right to a fair trial); United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1148 (6th Cir.
1991) (single set of remarks asking jury to "tell her and all of the other drug dealers like
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B. The Role of Intent in Reversals
1. The frequency of intentionally improper argument
The nature of the misconduct in the forty-five federal
reversals indicates that in a majority of the cases, the prosecutors
intentionally violated rules of proper argument. In twenty-eight of
the reversals-including fifteen direct appeals,97 six direct appeals
involving plain error review," and seven habeas cases99-the court
her.., that we don't want that stuff in Northern Kentucky" denied constitutional right to a
fair trial).
97. See United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
prosecutor's decision to argue that defendant had committed an uncharged, unproven and
essentially irrelevant murder "appears to have been a deliberate, calculated decision to assert
facts not in evidence in order to divert the jury from the real issues in the case" ); United
States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 393-98, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding comment on
defendant's silence was intended to call jury's attention to his failure to testify); United States
v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 499 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding remarks that evidence was
"uncontroverted" were manifestly intended to indicate to the jury that defendant, who did not
testify, was "the only one who could have controverted it"); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d
1103 (11 th Cir. 1995) (knowing false argument while deliberately suppressing exculpatory
evidence that would demonstrate falseness); United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753 (1st Cir.
1994) (analogy between defendants running from police and "still running and hiding" at trial
was deliberate Griffin violation); United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1102 (1 lth Cir.
1994) (deliberate disobedience of court order not to refer to sales to certain customers and
clearly improper attempts to impeach witnesses with inadmissible bad acts); United States v.
Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (improper argument, including that defendant was a
"professional criminal" when he was not and prosecutor conceded this at trial); United States
v. Udechukwu, II F.3d 1101 (Ist Cir. 1993) (knowing use of false evidence); United States v.
Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (repeated and deliberate false denials and argument by
government that it was unable to produce key witness for cross examination); United States v.
Payne, 2 F.3d 706, 714 (6th Cir. 1993) (argument about Christmas, the plight of the poor and
hard economic times "part of a calculated effort used to evoke strong sympathetic
emotions"); Commonwealth v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1993) (inflammatory and
knowingly false argument made to jury); United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th
Cir. 1991) (inflammatory remark designed with purpose and effect to inflame jurors'
emotions); United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1991) ("relentless attempt
to convict Appellant through his association with the [Hells Angels] motorcycle club");
United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107, 109-11 (1Oth Cir. 1990) (opening argument referring to
evidence prosecutor never introduced was not in good faith); United States v. Friedman, 909
F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's remarks "invited" jury to ignore presumption of
innocence and requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
98. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (comments intended to
call attention to defendant's failure to testify); United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156,
159 (5th Cir. 1995) (referring to excluded hearsay evidence in closing argument after repeated
adverse rulings and warnings by trial court); Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525,
530 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Almost any argument made in summation can be described as
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used language suggesting that the prosecutor made arguments he
or she knew or should have known were improper. In eleven
additional cases-including eight direct appeals, 10 one plain error
deliberate; but the several paragraphs of 150-proof rhetoric in this case oversteps the bounds
by a wide margin."); United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 242 & 244 (4th Cir. 1993)
("[G]iven the extent of the improper argument which ran throughout appellant's trial, we
believe no other conclusion is possible than our finding that the improper argument was
deliberately placed before the jury in an attempt 'to divert attention to extraneous matters.' ...
Not content with its case against the appellant, the prosecution chose to use improper
suggestion on cross-examination and improper jury argument to obtain a conviction."
(emphasis added)); United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
an "experienced United States Attorney deliberately introduced into the case his personal
opinion of the witnesses's credibility" (emphasis added)); United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d
923, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1992) (" [P]rosecutor's deliberately vouching for that witness on behalf
of the court would pose a clear threat to the integrity of judicial proceedings.").
99. See Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 788 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "by repeatedly
driving home references to Gravley's silence and implying that such silence was evidence
that Gravley was lying, the prosecutor crossed the line"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538,
1546-47 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (knowingly false argument); Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613 (6th
Cir. 1993) (violation of court order not to refer to other bad acts by defendant and
comparison of defendant to Hitler); Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1261 (7th Cir. 1992)
(remarks indirectly commenting on defendant's silence were "studied"); Brown v. Borg,
951 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1991) (knowingly false argument); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d
667, 670 (6th Cir. 1990) ("repeated and deliberate statements clearly designed to inflame
the jury and prejudice the rights of the accused"); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 355
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding "the prosecutorial misconduct here was severe, as demonstrated by
the studied pattern of improper remarks throughout the prosecutor's truncated initial
summation and her expansive rebuttal" (emphasis added)).
100. See United States. v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that argument
that it would have "cost a fortune" for defendant to turn in leased car earlier was improper
without mentioning intent); United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996)
(argument that witness who did not testify would corroborate witness who did testify
violates basic principle that argument is confined to matters in evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
prosecutor's references to defendants as "bad people" and thinly veiled references to them
as not being local residents violate basic principle to avoid appeals to prejudice); United
States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (closing argument that government agents
had testified that victim's trial testimony was consistent with her statement during earlier
out-of-court interviews when this was untrue violated basic principle that argument is
confined to the evidence; improper comments about defense lawyer clearly inflammatory);
United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994) (vouching, inflammatory rhetoric of
kind clearly prohibited by prior decisions); United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466, 469 (9th
Cir. 1993) (impeachment of defendant during cross-examination and closing argument on
basis of post-Miranda silence in violation of clear precedents); United States v. Teffera,
985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's repeated references in closing
argument to alleged eye contact between co-defendants at time of arrest clearly improper);
United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1992) (prosecutor request that jury
"stand as a bulwark" against drugs violates basic principle that argument be confined to
evidence and avoid inflammatory remarks).
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case, 0 and two habeas cases'° 2-although the court did not discuss
the prosecutor's intent, the improper argument was clearly
prohibited by prior decisions and was therefore conduct that the
prosecutor knew or should have known was improper. In two
other cases, even though the courts found that the prosecutors
engaged in the improper conduct inadvertently, it would appear
that the conduct was clearly outside the bounds set by previous
decisions.' 3 In only four cases does it appear that the prosecutor
made arguments that were not clearly prohibited by case law or
settled principles of argument. '"4
In sum, in forty-one of the forty-five recent reversals the
impropriety of the argument was well established and
consequently the prosecutor knew or should have known the
arguments made were improper. Thus, over ninety percent of the
reversals involved conduct from which prosecutors obeying the
settled rules of closing argument should have refrained.
Significant for this analysis, however, is that in twenty-eight of
these cases the reviewing court found that the prosecutor knew or
should have known that the argument made was improper,
101. See United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that remarks like
"the city is being taken over by people just like this" is a clear violation of the principle that
argument not appeal to racial passions).
102. See Miller v. Lockhart, 65 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1995) (numerous improper arguments
in penalty phase of capital case, including argument without support in record that
defendant had previously escaped from prison, violated basic principle confining argument
to the evidence); Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990) (voir dire and
closing arguments that presumption of innocence was designed to protect those who were
not guilty and stating that original presumption of innocence had been removed by the
evidence was clearly improper statement of the law).
103. See United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that inaccurate
argument that clothes in suitcase fit defendant was inadvertent, and noting that prosecutor
should have investigated chain of custody in preparing exhibits for trial); United States v.
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1389-90 (6th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor vouched "blatantly" for
credibility of government witness, but court finds "no indication that ... [remarks] were
deliberate"; precedents so clear that prosecutor should have known remarks were
improper).
104. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 706-14 (2d Cir. 1997) (issue of first
impression: whether comment on defendant's ability to listen to witnesses and "tailor" his
story violated confrontation clause); Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (1lth Cir. 1993) (no
clear precedent against argument quoting old Supreme Court opinion that murderers should
get no mercy); Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1529 (1I1th Cir. 1992) (same); Lesko v.
Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding as improper without a discussion of intent a
comment that defendant did not say he was sorry at penalty phase and that jury should show
him same mercy he showed victims).
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suggesting that to a majority of the deciding courts the
prosecutor's intent was significant, although in varied ways.
2. Intent in doctrine
The bases on which the twenty-eight opinions that considered
the fact that the prosecutor knew or should have known the
conduct was improper include: (a) the prosecutor's knowledge or
intent as part of the definition of improper conduct; (b) intent as a
consideration in determining whether improper argument is
reversible error; and (c) intentional wrongdoing as a factor in
considering whether to reverse for plain error. Each of these
doctrinal bases for considering intent is considered below. This
discussion focuses primarily on the reversal of federal convictions
on direct appeal. The role of intent may also arise in the post-
conviction context, but federal habeas courts are authorized to
grant relief in review of state court convictions only upon a
showing of violation of a federal constitutional right.' 5 Thus,
intent is relevant in this context only insofar as it implicates a
constitutional error.
a. The prosecutor's knowledge or intent as part of the
definition of improper conduct. In three categories of cases, the
court's definition of improper prosecutorial behavior includes an
element of intentional conduct: opening statement referring to
evidence not introduced at trial; commenting on the failure of
the defendant to testify; and the knowing use of false evidence.
The requirement of intent in each category is discussed below in
the context of the cases that found that the prosecutor's conduct
was improper.
(1) Opening Statement Referring to Evidence Not
Introduced at Trial. Although the prosecutor's opening
statement may not be thought of as argument, in many respects
misconduct in opening statements reflects the same concerns
that force a court to characterize a closing argument as
improper. This is particularly true when the prosecutor in the
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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opening statement alludes to facts that may not ultimately be
admitted at trial.
In United States v. Novak,'°6 the court held that when a
prosecutor refers to evidence in opening argument that is not later
introduced at the trial, courts "look to whether the prosecutor
acted in good faith and.., at the impact the statements had on the
particular trial"' 07 in deciding whether to overturn a conviction.
There is no discussion of the rationale for considering good faith
in Novak. The rule appears designed to excuse, or at least mitigate
the significance of, assertions in opening argument that turn out to
be unsupported by evidence introduced at trial, but which the
prosecutor had reason to believe would have evidentiary
support. 0 s
In Novak, the court found that prosecutor violated the good
faith standard by intentional conduct. The prosecutor stated in
opening argument that "a citizen reported and provided
information to the various DEA agents that the defendant ... was
selling cocaine from his house" and also stated he would
introduce evidence that cocaine was 91% pure, but the prosecutor
failed to introduce evidence to back up either claim. The court
found that "the prosecutor should have been well aware"',0 that
the citizen's tip was inadmissible hearsay because the government
had resisted the defendant's efforts to require disclosure of the
name of the informant. With respect to the purity of the cocaine,
the court found that prosecutor was aware that no evidence could
be offered to support the purity of the cocaine because the cocaine
was admitted pursuant to a stipulation that included no reference
to purity and which was the only evidence concerning the content
of the drugs. During the trial, however, the government relied on
hypothetical questions concerning the purity of the cocaine in
questioning witnesses. This attempt to "capitalize on evidence
which was inadmissible," "0 together with the attempt to use the
citizen's tip, was sufficient to meet the requirement of lack of
good faith.
106. 918 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1990).
107. Id. at 109.
108. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 3-5.5 cmt. (1993) (curative instructions
appropriate where failure to prove is through "honest inadvertence" of prosecutor).
109. Novak, 918 F.2d at 109.
110. Id. at 110.
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(2) Commenting on the failure of defendant to testify. A
prosecutor's remarks amount to impermissible comments on the
failure of the defendant to testify "if the prosecutor's manifest
intent was to comment on the defendant's silence or if the
character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally
and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's
silence.""' A court must find one of these alternatives-
manifest intent or necessary effect-to hold that the conduct was
improper. None of the cases in the study explained why manifest
intent is significant, but it appears to be a test that could insulate
from a finding of violation remarks that may be intended, but are
not manifestly intended, to comment on a defendant's failure to
testify.
Nevertheless, in three recent cases, courts have found that the
prosecutor's conduct rose to the level of manifest intent. In United
States v. Johnston, the court found that the prosecutor's closing
argument telling the jury not to consider a defendant's failure to
testify was made with manifest intent because it was a direct
comment on the failure to testify even though it did not ask the
jury to infer guilt from that silence."' This was especially so
because the prosecutor then cautioned the jury they could not say,
"Well, if they testified, well, maybe they would have explained
this." ' In addition the prosecutor had, in redirect of a government
witness (who had been challenged on cross examination to tell the
jury whether anyone could corroborate his claims concerning the
drug conspiracy at issue), gestured toward the defendants and
asked, "Aren't there some people in this courtroom that can back
up what you say?""' 4 The court found that the prosecutor made
this remark and gesture with "manifest intent to comment on the
defendants' failure to testify."" 
5
In United States v. Roberts,'16 the First Circuit reversed a
conviction for conspiracy to possess anabolic steroids because of
plain error in closing argument, including improper comments on
111. United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 396 (5th Cir. 1997).
112. Johnston, 127 F.3d at 399.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 397.
115. Id.
116. 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997).
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defendant's failure to testify. The prosecutor had used a rhetorical
device the court found improper:
You know, the thing in this case is that the defendant has
no obligation to testify and you should take that fact into
consideration in no way whatsoever. But with respect to the
rest of the case the defendant has the same responsibility
and that is to present a compelling case, if they are to go
forward." 7
The court saw these comments as a deliberate attempt to
emphasize improper, prejudicial information to the jury, but did
not specifically discuss whether there was manifest intent or
necessary effect.
In context, the jury, quite reasonably, could have
interpreted the prosecutor's comments in this case as
rhetorical flourishes meant to invite them to do just what
the introductory comments literally said they should not do.
Why else would the prosecutor be saying anything at all
about a forbidden subject matter?1 8
In United States v. Cotnam,"9 the court held that remarks that
defendant did not have to put evidence on and that government
evidence was "uncontroverted" were "manifestly intended to
indicate to the jury that" defendant, who did not testify, was "the
only one who could have controverted it." 0
In a fourth case, the court relied on the "naturally and
necessarily construe" alternate test instead of the "manifest
intent" test, but still found a way to comment on the prosecutor's
intent. In United States v. Hardy,' the First Circuit reversed a
firearms-related conviction because of an improper comment on
the defendants' failure to testify and four other prejudicial
remarks, including a comment on the defendants' senseless
violence, a reference to the danger to others because defendants
discarded weapons in an attempt to avoid police, the prosecutor's
vouching for government witnesses, and disparaging remarks
about defense counsel.
117. Id. at 1011 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1015.
119. 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 499.
121. 37 F.3d 753, 756-759 (Ist Cir. 1994).
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With regard to the defendants' failure to testify, the
prosecutor remarked in closing argument that defendants, who had
fled from the police at the time of their arrest, were "still running
and hiding today." 122 The court found a Griffin123 violation because
"[t]he natural and necessary implication of the prosecutor's
remark was... that the defendants were running from the
evidence presented against them, and hiding behind their right to
silence during the trial." 12 4 In a later portion of the opinion dealing
with whether the remarks were prejudicial, however, the court
made clear that it found the prosecutor should have known such
remarks were improper:
We believe that the comments were, in a sense, deliberate.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor had constructed an
analogy based on the facts of the case, with certain rhetoric
significantly repeated, which appeared to be planned. We
do not believe that the prosecutor intentionally intended to
influence the jury by commenting on Hardy's silence, and
we hope that our belief is not misplaced. We do believe,
however, that when preparing or reviewing his proposed
closing, the prosecutor should have known that such a
comment was improper.
25
(3) Knowingly false arguments. As long ago as 1935,
the Supreme Court held that the use by the prosecutor of
evidence known to be false was a serious violation of due
process of law. 126 In 1967, in Miller v. Pate, 1 7 the Court held
that it was a denial of due process for a prosecutor to knowingly
introduce underwear supposedly belonging to defendant with
red stains on it and argue falsely that underwear was stained
with blood when the prosecutor knew that the stains were red
paint. By "deliberately misrepresent [ing] the truth," the
prosecutor violated the "Fourteenth Amendment [which] cannot
122. Id. at 757.
123. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that Fifth Amendment forbids
comment on defendant's failure to testify).
124. Hardy, 37 F.3d at 758.
125. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
126. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
127. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
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tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use
of false evidence." 128
The Court in Miller overturned the conviction without
discussing the strength of the other evidence against defendant or
otherwise considering whether this wrongful behavior affected the
result in the trial. In subsequent cases, however, knowing use of
false evidence has become a branch of due process law requiring
disclosure of exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland.
29
Under United States v. Agurs,"3 ° the constitutional duty to disclose
is determined by the materiality of the information not disclosed
and does not arise unless "omission [of disclosure] is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair
trial." 3 ' The standard for materiality differs depending on the
circumstances surrounding the failure to disclose. Ordinarily,
evidence not disclosed is material "only if the omitted evidence
creates a reasonable doubt that it did not otherwise exist." 
32
However, in cases where the prosecutor "knew, or should have
known" that evidence presented was perjured or false, a
conviction based on such error "must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury." 33 This standard is equivalent to a
requirement that there be reversal "unless the failure to
disclose.., would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
3 4
Thus, because the knowing use of false testimony corrupts the
"truth-seeking function of the trial process" it is subject to an
elevated standard of materiality.'35
The requirement that the prosecutor knew or should have
known the evidence was false for this elevated standard of
materiality to apply seems in tension with the later statement in
Agurs that "[i]f the suppression of the evidence results in
128. Id. at 6, 7. Interestingly, in later disciplinary proceedings brought by the Illinois State
Bar against the prosecutor, hearing officers found that there was blood in addition to the paint
on the shorts, and refused to discipline the prosecutor. See GERSHMAN, supra note 12, § 13.7;
Alshuler, supra note 4, at 651-72.
129. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
130. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976).
131. Id. at 108.
132. Id. at 112.
133. Id. at 103.
134. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985).
135. See id. at 678-80, 710 (1985) (quotingAgurs, 427 U.S. at 104).
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constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence,
not the character of the prosecutor." '36 To the extent these two
ideas can be harmonized, they seem to suggest that the
prosecutor's use of evidence with knowledge it is false amounts to
improper conduct regardless of the prosecutor's subjective
intentions or motivations; once such an impropriety is established,
a conviction must be reversed unless the use of the false evidence
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The subtle differences between knowing use of false
evidence and the prosecutor's intent seem to have escaped the
courts that encountered such conduct in the context of closing
arguments. In each of the following six cases, the prosecutor made
closing arguments that the prosecutor knew were based in some
way on evidence that was false; in each of them, the court
commented extensively and disapprovingly on the intentional
nature of the prosecutor's actions.
In four of the six cases, the court analyzed the arguments
directly as Brady violations, in whole or in part. In United States v.
Alzate,'37 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a drug conviction where
defendant's defense was one of duress, but a government agent
testified that defendant had admitted in the interrogation room that
he was being paid $8,000 to transport the cocaine with which he
was caught. Defendant claimed a language barrier between the
agent and him confused the interrogation, and that his statement
about the $8,000 was made in reference to a question about the
value of another box of cocaine in the interrogation room, not in
answer to whether he was paid to transport cocaine. The
government agent testified that there was only one box of cocaine
in the interrogation room. The prosecutor then represented at
sidebar that there was only one box, cross-examined defendant in
ways that suggested that defendant's story was implausible
because there was only one box of cocaine in the interrogation
room, and argued eight times to the jury in closing that
defendant's sole purpose in carrying the cocaine was to obtain
$8,000. However, before putting on his rebuttal evidence, the
prosecutor learned from the agent that there were two boxes of
cocaine in the interrogation room, a fact that would have
136. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
137. 47 F.3d 1103 (11 th Cir. 1995).
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buttressed defendant's credibility. Nonetheless, he presented
rebuttal witnesses and let the case go to the jury without disclosing
this fact.
In explaining its reversal, the court expressed exasperation at
the prosecutor:
The reason matters went awry is that ... the representative
of the Government of the United States in that courtroom,
chose to keep silent and not disclose his knowledge that
statements he had made to the court and jury were false....
Thus, .. . [the prosecutor] urged the jury to deliver a verdict
that spoke the truth, after he himself had chosen not to
reveal it.'
Because the court saw this violation as a failure to disclose,
improper under the Brady line of cases, it had a clear doctrinal
basis-the knowing failure to disclose that evidence was false-in
which to place its conclusion. 3 9 Under settled law, knowing failure
to disclose that evidence introduced was false requires reversal "if
there was any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury." ,40
In United States v. Udechukwu,'41 the First Circuit reversed a
drug conviction because the prosecutor had deliberately failed to
disclose evidence that tended to corroborate defendant's duress
defense. Defendant admitted carrying drugs, but claimed that she
had done so under threats from a drug trafficker whose name she
gave to the agents who arrested her. Although the prosecutor was
aware that there was a drug trafficker with a nearly identical name
operating in the area from which defendant transported the drugs,
the prosecutor argued in closing that the defense was an incredible
fabrication unsupported by any evidence. Doctrinally, the court
characterized the prosecutor's behavior as "a kind of double-
acting prosecutorial error," violating both the Brady duty to
disclose information and the prosecutor's duty not to deliberately
mislead the jury in closing argument. 4 1
138. Id. at 1108.
139. Id. at 1109.
140. Id. at 1110 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103).
141. II F.3d 1101 (lstCir. 1993).
142. Id. at 1106 (At that time, "whether it was deliberate or accidental" was one of the
factors used by the First Circuit in deciding whether to reverse.).
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In United States v. Kojayan,'a the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded a drug conviction for a hearing on whether the case
should be dismissed for outrageous misconduct by the prosecutor
and his supervisors. Prior to trial, the defense requested
information on the whereabouts of an alleged co-conspirator and
whether that individual had entered into a cooperation agreement
with the government. The government rebuffed the request. At
trial, the Assistant United States Attorney introduced a statement
of the co-conspirator incriminating defendants and represented to
the court that the co-conspirator would not testify because he
would claim the privilege against self incrimination, when in fact
the witness had a cooperation agreement with the government that
obligated him to testify truthfully for the government.'" When the
defense argued that the jury should not rely on the hearsay
statement of the co-conspirator because the government could
have called the witness, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the
defense's contention was
a classic example of asking the jury to speculate .... The
government can't force someone to talk. They have to
agree to talk after they have been arrested. Well, you can
figure out defendant Nourian was arrested. He has Fifth
Amendment rights. He has the right to remain silent. The
government can't force anyone to talk. It is against their
Fifth Amendment rights. Don't be misled that the
government could have called Nourian.' 5
The government continued to deny the existence of the
cooperation agreement after a guilty verdict, at a motion for a new
trial, and on appeal in both its brief and at oral argument. The
agreement was disclosed only after the appellate panel issued an
order giving the government the opportunity to "rethink its
position." 146  Even then, the government did not accept
responsibility for the false statements. 14' Doctrinally, the court saw
this as a Brady violation and specifically cited United States v.
Agurs,14 in finding the error prejudicial. Moreover, the court found
143. 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 1318.
145. Id. at 1317-18.
146. Id. at 1320.
147. Id. at 1323.
148. 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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the behavior sufficiently outrageous to remand to the district court
to consider whether retrial should be barred.
In Brown v. Borg,149 the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief
where the state prosecutor, in order to obtain a conviction for
felony murder based on robbery, used evidence that a murder
victim's wallet and jewelry were not with him when admitted to a
hospital and then relied on that evidence in closing argument to
obtain a conviction when he knew that the wallet and jewelry had
been given to the victim's family and provided no evidence of
robbery. Although the prosecutor disclosed the false evidence in
post-verdict state court proceedings, the state court remedy of
reduction of conviction to second-degree murder was not
sufficient because the misrepresentation could have contributed to
the jury's assessment of the defendant's motivations to kill the
victim. The court, seeing this as a Brady case, held that the
knowing use of false evidence placed the case under a higher
standard of scrutiny than ordinary failure to disclose. 5° The
prosecutor's intent, however, was clearly relevant to the court:
The prosecutor's actions in this case are intolerable.
Possessed of knowledge that destroyed her theory of the
case, the prosecutor had a duty not to mislead the jury.
Instead, she kept the facts secret in the face of a long-
standing rule of constitutional stature requiring disclosure,
and then presented testimony in such a way as to suggest
the opposite of what she alone knew to be true: that the
wallet and chains had not been stolen ... Such conduct
perverts the adversarial system and endangers its ability to
produce results. In response to the threat that such
misconduct poses to the rule of law, the Constitution
requires [such] convictions ... to be overturned unless the
misconduct can be proven to be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. 151
In counterpoint to its obvious displeasure with the conduct of
the prosecutor in this case, the court noted, however, that "when
exculpatory evidence is withheld, attention focuses on the effect
149. 951 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1991).
150. Id. at 1015 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 n.9 (1985)).
151. Id.
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on the defendant's right to due process; the prosecutor's intentions
are irrelevant." '52
In the two other cases involving closing arguments based on
evidence the prosecutor knew to be false, the courts discussed the
intentional wrongdoing not as part of its analysis of Brady issues,
but instead under the tests that govern errors in prosecutorial
argument.
In United States v. Wilson,'53 the Fourth Circuit reversed a
conviction for selling drugs where the prosecutor argued that the
defendant had murdered a potential buyer; evidence in the record
showed only that the defendant had shot at a passing car. In
addition, not only had the trial court specifically excluded
testimony concerning the fate of the driver, the prosecutor had
discovered that another person had been convicted of killing the
driver of that car and failed to disclose this information to the
defense. The court had little difficulty in concluding that the
argument was improper; it referred to matters not in evidence-
indeed a matter excluded by the court-and was vulnerable to
attack based on exculpatory information not disclosed by the
prosecutor. '54
In deciding whether the improper conduct should be the basis
for reversal, the court ignored the Brady violation and treated the
case as one of improper prosecutorial argument. It found that the
prosecutor's decision to argue that the defendant had committed
an uncharged, unproven and essentially irrelevant murder
"appears to have been a deliberate and calculated decision to
assert facts not in evidence in order to divert the jury from the real
issues in the case." "' Because the Fourth Circuit's four-factor test
for determining prejudice from misconduct in argument includes
"whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury
to divert attention to extraneous matters," " the court had a basis
other than Brady for considering prosecutorial intent. However it
reached its ultimate conclusion based on the potential prejudice
resulting from the conduct, not on the intention of the prosecutor:
"The risk is too great that Talley was convicted because the jury
152. Id.
153. 135 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 1998).
154. Id. at 296-302.
155. Id. at 302.
156. Id. at 299.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
thought he was a murderer, a reason wholly irrelevant to his guilt
or innocence on the changes in the indictment." '
In Davis v. Zant,'58 an Eleventh Circuit habeas case, the court
overturned a state murder conviction based in part on defendant's
confession prior to trial. Defendant testified that he had confessed
to protect his girl friend who was the real killer. When he tried to
testify that his girl friend had confessed to the killing, the
prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds and stated in front of the
jury that this was not true. The prosecutor then argued five times
in closing that the defense contention that the girl friend was the
killer was a fabrication for trial even though the prosecutor knew
that girl friend had long ago confessed to the murder and even
though the prosecutor had stated in pretrial proceedings that he
expected this to be the defense. The court was understandably
outraged at the prosecutor's behavior.
These misstatements portrayed the core of the defense case
as an afterthought fabricated during trial after the state
closed its evidence. The statements were not only clearly
false, but the record in this case establishes beyond doubt
that the misrepresentations were intentional and known to
the prosecutor to be false." 9
In its decision the court focused on whether the impropriety
was "deliberate or accidental," a factor in the Eleventh Circuit's
test for reversal on direct appeal, not its test for whether to grant a
habeas corpus petition. It did so in part because although a
previous opinion of the Eleventh Circuit en banc had suggested
that the prosecutor's intent was usually irrelevant in habeas corpus
cases, that opinion allowed for an exception in cases where the
prosecutor's intentional misconduct was equivalent to the knowing
use of false evidence.' 6'
b. Intent as a consideration in deciding whether improper
argument is reversible on direct appeal. Once a court decides
that conduct is improper, it must then decide whether the
157. Id. at 302.
158. 36 F.3d 1538 (1lth Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 1538.
160. Id. at 1550 (citing Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1402 n.26 (I Ith Cir.) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), reinstated, 809 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(en banc)).
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
impropriety results in reversible error. The issue arises either
where the error has been properly preserved, or where
unpreserved claims are reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
The standards governing federal appeals are complicated and
the courts of appeals' decisions are in a state of considerable
confusion over them. In direct federal appeals, the issue of
whether to reverse turns on harmless error analysis. If a
prosecutorial argument is shown to have deprived a defendant of
constitutional rights, the judgment must be reversed unless the
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 161 With regard to
appeals not involving deprivation of constitutional rights, under
federal statute the reviewing "court shall give judgment...
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." 162 In Kotteakos v. United States,
163
the Supreme Court held that under the predecessor to this statute,
lower court judgments should be reversed only if the error below
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict."'64
The Kotteakos standard seems clearly applicable to appeals
challenging prosecutorial argument as non-constitutional error.
Kotteakos cited with approval the application in Berge v. United
States 6 and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 166 of the
harmless error statute to the issue of prosecutorial misconduct.
67
161. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 181 (1986), and Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), the Court held
that where constitutional violations not involving a specific constitutional right are claimed,
the Chapman test does not apply because there is no constitutional error unless the
prosecutors actions "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process." Donnelly, in particular, based this elevated standard on the fact it was
a habeas corpus case, not a direct appeal involving the court's supervisory powers and "the
distinction between ordinary trial error of a prosecutor and that sort of egregious misconduct
held.., to amount to a denial of constitutional due process." 416 U.S. at 647-48. Because
federal direct appeals allow courts to reverse for "ordinary trial error" and because federal
appellate courts do have supervisory powers over direct appeals, the Darden-Donnelly
standard will not be discussed further.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
163. 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1944) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 391, which included substantially
the same language).
164. Id.
165. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
166. 310U.S. 150(1940).
167. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757 n.8 (Berger); id. at 763-64 (Socony-Vacuum).
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Nonetheless, not a single one of the twenty-five direct appeals in
this study even mentioned Kotteakos or its harmless error
standard.168
Rather than referring to the overall standard of review, the
lower courts appear to be guided by core prejudice analysis-the
impact of the improper argument on the result. Even here,
however, there is a clear split in the circuits over whether the
prosecutor's intentional wrongdoing is a consideration explicitly
relevant to reversal.
(1) The three-factor test. The Second,169  Third,170
Fifth,"' Seventh,7 7 Eighth,173 Tenth, 74 and D.C. Circuits'75 have
168. Instead, courts have articulated more than a dozen different overall standards that
supposedly govern their review in direct appeals and none of them is, without further
explanation, compatible with Kotteakos. In United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385-86
(6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit noted the confusion in that one circuit alone, which had at
least three tests for reversal. Even Carroll, which adopted a new, unified approach, did not
discuss Kotteakos or the harmless error statute.
169. United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1990) (in assessing whether in
the context of the whole trial, misconduct was prejudicial the court focused on three factors:
the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty
of conviction absent the misconduct).
170. United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In determining
prejudice, we consider the scope of the objectionable comments and their relationship to the
entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength
of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction.").
171. United States v. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing
that once misconduct is found, the court considers three factors to determine whether
defendant is entitled to reversal: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the statements;
(2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction; and (3) the strength of the evidence of the
defendant's guilt).
172. In United States v. Cotnan, the Seventh Circuit expanded on the three-factor test
and included two additional factors relating to the conduct of defense counsel:
(1) the nature and seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct, (2) whether the
prosecutor's statements were invited by impermissible conduct of defense
counsel, (3) whether the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the
statements, (4) whether the defense was able to counter the improper statements
through rebuttal, and (5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant.
88 F.3d 487, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 606 (7th
Cir. 1997) (essentially the same factors).
173. United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 1985) ("There are three
factors that the courts usually consider to determine the prejudicial effect of prosecutorial
misconduct: (I) the cumulative effect of such misconduct; (2) the strength of the properly
admitted evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (3) the curative actions taken by the trial
court.").
174. United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411,416 (10th Cir. 1988)) ("In determining whether the
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adopted some form of a three-factor test that does not explicitly
mention deliberateness or intent. A common articulation of the
test weighs "the severity of the misconduct, the measures
adopted to cure it, and the certainty of conviction absent the
misconduct." 176
Whatever the articulation of the test, it is clearly aimed at
determining the impact of the improper comments on the
verdict.'77 The "severity of the misconduct" measures the likely
effect of the remarks themselves on the jury. The "measures
adopted to cure it" assesses whether curative instructions were
given; if so, these are usually considered to be effective in curing
or at least mitigating the prejudice. The final factor weighs the
strength of the other evidence against the accused; the stronger the
evidence against the accused, the less likely that the prejudice
from the remarks affected the verdict. None of these factors
explicitly or implicitly considers the prosecutor's intent.
misconduct affected the outcome, we consider: 'the curative acts of the district court, the
extent of the misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within the case as a whole.' ").
175. United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that in
determining whether to reverse a conviction on grounds of misstatement in closing argument,
the court must determine whether the remarks were improper and whether they substantially
prejudiced the jury, and consider measures taken to cure the prejudice and the certainty of
conviction absent the remarks); see also United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 895 (D.C.
Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superseded in part on rehearing, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(discussing history of somewhat different tests).
176. United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1990).
177. The Ninth Circuit has no settled checklist of considerations and relies on an overall
standard: reversal if it appears more probable than not that the alleged misconduct affected the
jury's verdict. See Commonwealth v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 487 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled
on other grounds by George v. Comacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing for improper prosecutorial vouching
during trial). The Ninth Circuit's test appears to be an adaptation of Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1944), but neither the court's decision, nor the variations of it are discussed.
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(2) The Leon four-factor test. Four circuits have taken a
different approach. They apply some version of a test first
articulated in 1976 in United States v. Leon' as a way of
assessing whether prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. Leon
created a checklist of the following four factors to be considered
in assessing whether improper prosecutorial argument warrants
reversal:
(1) the degree to which the remarks complained of have a
tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused;
(2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether
they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the
jury; and (4) the strength of the competent proofs
introduced to establish the guilt of the accused.'79
Courts in the First, 8 ° Fourth,' Sixth,8 2 and Eleventh'
8 3
circuits have adhered to some version of this four-factor test.
178. 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976).
179. Id.
180. The First Circuit, in United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1489 (1st Cir. 1991),
articulated the test as follows:
In deciding whether a new trial is required--either because prosecutorial
misconduct likely affected a trial's outcome or to deter such misconduct in the
future-we consider "the severity of the miscondlict, whether it was deliberate
or accidental, the likely effect of the curative instruction and the strength of the
evidence against appellant."
Id. (quoting United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 745 (1st Cir. 1985), which in turn quotes
United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 586-87 (Ist Cir. 1982)); accord United States v.
Udechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101, 1106(1st Cir. 1993) (includes fifth factor: "the context in which it
occurred"). But see United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994) (listing the
following factors for consideration of whether improper comments warrant a new trial: (1) the
severity of the misconduct; (2) the context in which it occurred; (3) whether the judge gave
any curative instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendant (emphasis
added to show change from "deliberate or accidental" to "context")). In United States v.
Hardy, the court found constitutional error and used the same Manning version of the four-
factor test to assess prejudice, but discussed the fact that the prosecutor "should have known"
that his argument was improper in considering the "severity of the misconduct" factor. 37
F.3d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1994).
181. United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Several factors are
relevant to the determination of prejudice, including: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's
remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the
remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof
introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were
deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters."); accord United
States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mitchell, I F.3d 235, 241
(4th Cir. 1993).
182. The Sixth Circuit originally decided and adhered to Leon. A number of panels have
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The consideration included in the minority rule (the four-
factor test) not present in the majority rule (the three-factor test) is
whether the improper argument was "deliberately or accidentally
placed before the jury."' 4 Therefore, the critical difference
between the majority rule and the minority rule is the relevance of
intent.
The doctrinal basis for considering whether the prosecutor's
conduct was deliberate is uncertain. The Leon court, which
formulated the four-factor test, clearly considered the improper
nature of the prosecutor's conduct important to its decision to
reverse, but it did not offer a coherent or extensive explanation
why the prosecutor's intent was relevant. It noted that the circuit
had condemned "prosecutorial overkill" requiring the court to
reverse "in the exercise of our supervisory authority."' 85 The cases
it cited focused on the prejudice from the prosecutor's improper
remarks, not on their deliberateness.
now modified this approach. See United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1994),
discussed under the Bess-Carroll approach below.
183. In Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 950 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983), the court adopted the four-
factor Leon tests for federal habeas review of state convictions. However, in Brooks v. Kemp,
the court questioned Hance:
Hance also listed as a factor whether the remarks were deliberately or
accidentally placed before the jury. While that factor may be more clearly, or
more frequently, relevant for a court with supervisory powers over the conduct
of the prosecutor, there may be cases where the prosecutor's intentional conduct
rises to a level equivalent to a knowing use of false evidence.
762 F.2d 1383, 1402 n.26 (11th Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016
(1986), reinstated, 809 F.2d 700 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Thus, Brooks suggests that deliberateness may be an appropriate factor on direct
appeal where the court has "supervisory power." After Brooks, two panels of the Eleventh
Circuit have suggested that the four Leon factors are appropriate even in a habeas case. See
Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1545 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Davis, 840 F.2d 834, 838 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
184. This is the formulation in the First, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. In the Fourth Circuit,
the standard is more focused: "whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury
to divert attention to extraneous matters." See United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 299
(4th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
185. United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976).
186. See United States v. Smith, 500 F.2d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 1974) (stating it is relying on
supervisory powers, but resting decision on effect of improper remarks on jury, not
prosecutor's intent); United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1974) (declining to reverse
under supervisory powers, mentioning lack of bad faith in improper argument and affirming
because of overwhelming evidence); United States v. Peak, 498 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1974)
(prejudice, not intent, basis for opinion); United States v. Calvert, 498 F.2d 409 (6th Cir.
1974) (same).
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However the First Circuit supplied a rationale in United
States v. Capone,'87 where the court stated that reversals for
prosecutorial misconduct are appropriate either when, despite a
curative instruction, the misconduct was likely to have affected the
trial's outcome, or when a sanction is necessary to deter future
prosecutorial misconduct."' The court then held that the facts in
Capone "suggest[ ] that the appeal to passion was less than
deliberate, making it inappropriate to reverse these convictions as
a 'disciplinary sanction.' " 189
The First Circuit's position that reversal may be used as a
tool to discipline prosecutors and to deter future misconduct is the
most plausible explanation why a court would include the
prosecutor's intent in the considerations that influence its decision
to affirm or reverse,' 9° but it is also doctrinally suspect. Although
appellate courts have supervisory responsibility over the attorneys
who practice in courts over which they have jurisdiction and have
supervisory power to fashion remedies to deter illegal conduct, '9'
the power of appellate courts to do so would appear limited by
United States v. Hasting.'92 The Supreme Court held in Hasting
that courts must conduct harmless error analysis and should not
reverse in order to deter future misconduct where the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and "where means more
narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are
available."' 93
In response to this concern, at least two of the circuits that
follow the Leon test are modifying their approach. The First
Circuit has specifically acknowledged that Hasting limits its
power to reverse in order to deter future misconduct. In United
187. 683 F.2d 582, 586-87 (1st Cir. 1982) (declining to reverse a conviction for an
improper remark that the wounded police officer was waiting for the jury's decision).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. The only other explanation would be using the prosecutor's intentions as an indication
of the effect the prosecutor's words had on the jury. Cf Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383,
1431, 1435 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting) (intent, in the sense of the
natural and probable consequences of remarks, reflects likely effect), vacated on other
grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), reinstated, 809 F.2d 700 (1 lth Cir. 1987).
191. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980).
192. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
193. Id. at 506 n.5 and accompanying text.
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States v. Manning," the court did not include "whether it was
deliberate or accidental" in its list of considerations relevant to
assessing prejudice and indicated that its revised list is aimed at
determining "whether the misconduct likely affected the trial's
outcome."' 95 The court then explained that although the line of
authority in the First Circuit "speaks of the need to deter future
prosecutorial misconduct... as an additional legitimate basis for
reversal," the court's "power to act solely on this basis has...
been significantly circumscribed by [Hasting]." 196 The court added
that "while we fervently hope that our decision might have the
effect of deterring prosecutors from straying into forbidden
territory in the future, we emphasize that today's result is in no
way informed by a deterrent animus." 97
If the panel in Manning meant to eliminate consideration of
the deliberateness of the prosecutor's conduct from the factors
considered in deciding whether to reverse, it failed to do so. In
United States v. Hardy,'98 for example, the court adopted
Manning's revised list eliminating the "deliberate or accidental"
factor, but nonetheless used the "severity of the misconduct" as a
basis for considering prosecutor's intent in arguing to the jury that
the defendants were still "running and hiding" during the trial.' 9
Thus, even the explicit elimination of deliberateness as an explicit
factor in reversal analysis did not prevent the court from
considering it.
The Sixth Circuit is in the process of modifying its approach.
In United States v. Carroll,2°° a panel of the Sixth Circuit reviewed
the history in that circuit of inconsistent approaches to standards
and methods used to determine whether or not to reverse, °'
including the Leon four-factor approach, the Thomas test-
reversible error if misconduct is "so pronounced and persistent
that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial,"202 and the Bess
194. 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994).
195. Id. at 574.
196. Id. n.2.
197. Id.
198. 37 F.3d 753 (1st Cir. 1994).
199. Id. at 758.
200. 26 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1994).
201. Id. at 1383-87.
202. United States v. Thomas, 728 F.2d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1984).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
test-not reversible error "if it is not flagrant, where proof of guilt
is overwhelming, where counsel does not object and/or where the
trial judge steps in and admonishes the jury."2 3 In an attempt to
rationalize the standards and bring some consistency within the
circuit, the court in Carroll disavowed the Thomas test as "an
unfortunate retreat from . . . Leon and Bess standards,"204 and
proposed to synthesize the Leon and Bess tests as follows: the first
three Leon factors0 5 would be used to distinguish "flagrant" from
"non-flagrant" prosecutorial error;2 °6 if the error is found non-
flagrant, prosecutorial error can result in reversal only when (1)
the proof against the defendant was not overwhelming, (2)
opposing counsel objected to the conduct, and (3) the district court
failed to give a curative instruction.0 7 The court in Carroll found
the clearly improper vouching in that case non-flagrant, but
nonetheless reversed because its tests for reversing non-flagrant
errors was met.The Carroll approach has now been followed by
three panels of the Sixth Circuit.208 Neither Carroll nor its progeny
have yet found any misconduct to be flagrant. No case has yet
explained what the precise consequences of a finding of flagrancy
would be. Presumably, some standards more receptive to reversal
would apply to flagrant misconduct. But the rationale for
considering the intent of the prosecutor in finding flagrancy and
the consistency of that rationale with Hasting are yet to be
developed.2°9
203. United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 757 (6th Cir. 1979).
204. Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1386.
205. The three factors are the degree to which the remarks complained of have a tendency
to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused, whether they were isolated or extensive, and
whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury. United States v. Leon,
534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976).
206. Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385-86 (no discussion of consequences for appellate review of a
finding that the argument was "flagrant").
207. Id. at 1385-1386.
208. See United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 394 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown, 66 F.3d 124, 127 (6th
Cir. 1995).
209. The second installment of this article, appearing in a forthcoming issue of The Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process, will suggest that elevating the standard of review to
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in cases of flagrant misconduct would both effectuate the
deterrence sought by appellate courts and be consistent with Hasting (which only bars
reversals where the improper argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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For present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the
prosecutor's wrongdoing is an important consideration for
appellate courts, but that the legitimacy of considering the
prosecutor's intent is clearly called into question by Hasting.
However, even when courts acknowledge the limitations of
Hasting, they continue to write opinions that suggest that the
intention of the prosecutor affects their decision to reverse."O
Moreover, courts in circuits that have adopted the Leon test
consider the intentional nature of the misconduct a factor weighing
in favor of reversal."' Even in circuits that do not include the
prosecutor's intent as a specific factor in their analysis of
prejudice, intentional behavior and the need to deter such behavior
clearly influence courts to reverse."'
Two things are therefore clear from this discussion. First,
many courts are influenced to reverse when they find that
prosecutors are making arguments they knew or should have
known were improper. Second, the doctrinal framework, which
does not clearly allow courts to reverse a conviction solely to deter
future misconduct, is in need of rethinking and clarification. The
tests currently articulated by the courts will not function properly
210. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversal for Griffin
error mentions intent as part of its analysis of the severity of the misconduct).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (using and
applying factor "whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters); United States v. Blakey, 14 F.3d 1557, 1560 (11 th Cir. 1994)
(discussing without cites to Leon tests, fact that prosecutor knew argument was false); see
also United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing for plain
error without mentioning Leon tests, but discussing intentional nature of argument prejudicing
defendant, including improper comments on defendant's membership in a motorcycle gang);
United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying Fourth Circuit version of Leon
tests in a plain-error case).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1997) ("We are
very reluctant to set aside a jury verdict rendered after a long, expensive, contentious trial,
at which the district judge performed a creditable job of managing overzealous counsel.
Nevertheless, somewhere we must draw the line and send a message to prosecutors that the
Constitution governs their actions at trial. This is such a case."); Commonwealth v.
Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 487 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by George v.
Comacho, 119 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor's suggestions that Mendiola would
walk out of the courtroom right behind them, if acquitted, and presumably retrieve the
missing murder weapon was particularly improper because the prosecutor knew that his
witness, the informer Reyes, was responsible for the missing gun and admonished that "[a]
prosecutor's use of illegitimate means to obtain a verdict brings his office and our system
of justice into disrepute." ).
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if they do not allow for consideration of those factors that clearly
influence the judges.
c. Intentional prosecutorial misconduct in plain error
cases. In federal courts, proper preservation of claims of
improper closing argument requires defense counsel to object
during the argument or, perhaps, move for a mistrial after
argument. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure gives appellate courts the power to consider
improprieties not objected to below: "Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court." Supreme Court
decisions have made it clear that, to qualify as plain error,
challenged conduct must not only meet the stated requirements
of being "error," "plain," and "affecting substantial rights," 3
but must also be so extreme as to "seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 1 4
In the 1990s, federal courts of appeals have found plain error
in seven cases involving prosecutorial argument. Of these, only
one opinion has directly connected the conclusion that the
prosecutor's improper arguments were intentional with the
"fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"
language. In United States v. Smith,"5 the Ninth Circuit reversed a
conviction for plain error because the prosecutor had repeatedly
vouched for government witnesses. The court was concerned, in
particular, with the prosecutor's argument that "if I did anything
wrong in this trial, I wouldn't be here. The court wouldn't allow
that to happen."21 6 The court found that these comments were
plain error because the "prosecutor's deliberately vouching for
that witness on behalf of the court would pose a clear threat to the
integrity of judicial proceedings."" 7
213. In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993), the Court stated that normally
"the defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the 'affecting substantial
rights' prong of Rule 52(b)."
214. Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
215. 962 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1992).
216. Id. at 928 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 936.
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Although five of the six other plain error reversals referred
pointedly to the intentional misconduct of the prosecutor, none of
these articulated any connection between intentional misconduct
and the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
In United States v. Roberts,"8 discussed above with regard to
the definition of Griffin error, the court also found intentional
misconduct, not only in the prosecutor's comments to the jury
regarding the defendant's failure to testify, but also his comments
regarding the defendant's membership in a motorcycle gang. The
prosecutor argued at trial:
It was brought out throughout the course of the trial that the
reason that Tibbetts was afraid of the problems, is that
Tibbetts was aware that Roberts [the defendant] was the
treasurer, I believe, of the Sarasins Motorcycle. That fact
should not qualify [sic] you in any way in reaching your
verdict because if you do, you will have decided the case
for the wrong reasons, whether he is a member of a
motorcycle gang 2or whatever, has nothing to do with the
facts of this case.
This prosecutor's rhetorical device-similar to the device
used in the same case to call attention to defendant's failure to
testify-was characterized by the court as a deliberate attempt to
emphasize improper, prejudicial information to the jury. "Why
else would the prosecutor be saying anything at all about a
forbidden subject matter? ' 220 The court then recited appropriateS .• 221
plain error doctrine, but made no attempt to organize its opinion
around its requirements. Instead, it rested its ultimate decision to
reverse on its conclusion that the "instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, in combination, undermined the fundamental fairness
of the trial. 222 It appears that the planned nature of the
prosecutor's remarks contributed to this finding of fundamental
unfairness, but the court made no explicit statement of this
connection.
218. 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997).
219. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1014.
222. Id. at 1016.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
In United States v. Flores-Chapa,223 the Fifth Circuit reversed
a drug conviction for plain error because of the prosecutor's
repeated improper references to an excluded post-arrest hearsay
statement by the defendant's son-in-law that was the crucial link
implicating the defendant, an alleged co-conspirator. The court
reversed and dismissed because the properly admitted evidence
was not sufficient to implicate the defendant. It did not directly
discuss whether the plain error affected the "fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." Without linking its
discussion to any of these standards, the court made clear that the
prosecutor made the arguments knowing them to be improper.
"Despite two sustained objections, a specific warning to
government counsel and two specific instructions to the jury, the
government again made reference to the excluded testimony
during its closing argument." 22 4 The court found that the remarks
were plain error and that they "affected substantial rights," which
it equated with prejudice to the defendant because "the
government itself not only elicited the original hearsay, but then
repeated the excluded evidence in front of the jury." '225
In Arrieta-Agressot v. United States,226 the First Circuit
reversed a drug conviction for plain error when the prosecutor had
adopted a "war-on-drugs" theme in his initial closing argument
and throughout his rebuttal. The court quoted several paragraphs
of the arguments, which included:
Nobody has a right to poison the people and poison our
children.... I know the pain, the suffering that is brought
to many families by the use of drugs, by the use of
marijuana, by the addiction to marijuana.
... [W]e are here today because we want to say no to
drugs. We want to say no to what is corrupting and
disrupting the society, because marijuana not only disrupts
and corrupts our society but it also corrupts and disrupts
any society in the world.
But thank God... we had the Coast Guard... protecting
us... [t]o save you all from the evil of drugs. Because the
223. 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
224. Id. at 159.
225. Id. at 161.
226. 3 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1993).
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defendants are not soldiers in the army of good. They are
soldiers in the army of evil, in the army which only purpose
[sic] is to poison, to disrupt, to corrupt."'
In view of two prior decisions in which the First Circuit had
specifically condemned similar, though milder, versions of such
war-on-drugs rhetoric,"' the court expressed consternation that not
only did the prosecutor at trial engage in this argument, but that
the office defended the arguments on appeal. 29
In reaching its decision to reverse, the court noted that:
Although the extent of the prejudice is the paramount issue,
we think it necessary to say that the nature of the
misconduct also plays a part in our judgment. Almost any
argument made in summation can be described as
deliberate; but the several paragraphs of 150-proof rhetoric
in this case overstep the bounds by a wide margin. °
The court expressed its concern that the prosecutor's
supervisors had not exercised more control over the inexperienced
prosecutor who tried the case. The opinion in no way connected its
concern about intentional wrongdoing to any plain error standards.
In United States v. Mitchell," ' the Fourth Circuit reversed as
plain error the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant's
brother and continuing improper argument. The prosecutor argued
that (1) because the defendant's brother had been convicted of the
same crime as defendant and the other jury obviously had not
believed the brother's testimony at his own trial, this jury should
not believe him either; and (2) the prior conviction of his brother
was substantive evidence against defendant. The intentional nature
of this conduct was a clear component of its finding that the error
here was "particularly egregious": "[n]ot content with its case
against the appellant, the prosecution chose to use improper
suggestion on cross-examination and improper jury argument to
obtain a conviction."232 The court did not, however, connect
227. Id. at 527.
228. See United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 955 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Doe,
860 F.2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1988).
229. Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 527-28.
230. Id. at 530.
231. 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 244 (emphasis added); see also id. at 242 (noting "[g]iven the extent of the
improper argument .... we believe that no other conclusion is possible than our finding that
the improper argument was deliberately placed before the jury in an attempt 'to divert
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intentional wrongdoing to the requirements for reversal for plain
error, relying instead on Fourth Circuit standards for determining
whether error was prejudicial.
In United States v. Kerr,233 the Ninth Circuit reversed for
plain error because the prosecutor vouched for government
witnesses by giving his personal opinion of their credibility. The
court was concerned with the intentional nature of the conduct:
"Here an experienced United States attorney deliberately
introduced into the case his personal opinion of the witnesses'
credibility. He repeatedly ignored his special obligation to avoid
improper suggestions and insinuations."234 Again, the court did
not, however, connect the intentional wrongdoing to criteria for
plain error reversals.
The only plain error case in which the court did not directly
discuss the intent of the prosecutor was United States v. Doe.235 In
Doe, the D.C. Circuit unanimously reversed for plain error a drug
conviction after the prosecution introduced expert evidence about
the pattern that Jamaicans followed in taking over the drug trade in
Washington, D.C. and then in summation suggested that the jury
resolve issues of whether the Jamaican defendants or the
government witnesses in whose apartment they were staying had
engaged in the drug trade because the defendants' conduct fit the
pattern that Jamaicans followed. The court found that remarks like
"the city is being taken over by people just like this" 23 6 amounted
to constitutionally impermissible " [a]ppeals to racial passion."237
The court made virtually no attempt to explain why the
argument met plain error standards, merely acknowledging that
plain errors must be "particularly egregious errors" and finding
that it was "plainly the case here" that the arguments "seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." 23 ' The court also avoided discussing the intent of the
prosecutor directly. Nonetheless, in its conclusion the court
attention to extraneous matters' ") (quoting United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1052
(4th Cir. 1983).
233. 981 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1992).
234. Id. at 1053.
235. 903 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
236. Id. at 23.
237. Id. at 25.
238. Id. at 26 (footnote and internal citations omitted).
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
referred to the prosecution's "temptation to relax rigid standards"
in narcotics cases, and emphasized that the "courtroom is not the
proper place in which to fight such a war,"239 certainly suggesting
the court's concern that the prosecutor knew that the conduct was
wrong.
The performance of the courts in the plain error cases is
curious because it would appear that intentional misconduct by the
prosecutor is a likely basis for finding that such error seriously
affects the integrity and public reputation of the trials in those
cases. Yet, although six of the seven opinions explicitly discussed
the prosecutor's intent, only one of the seven opinions made this
connection. The failure of the other six opinions to do so suggests
an uncertainty about the role of intent in plain error doctrine that
should be clarified.
III. RECIDIVIST PROSECUTORS: THE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS
People v. Hill and the following case study both illustrate the
problem of "prosecutorial recidivism" -the tendency of the same
prosecutor or office to engage in such misconduct repeatedly, even
in the face of admonishments from the court. A pattern of
recidivism is important in two respects: First, it provides some
basis and incentive for an appellate court to infer that the
misconduct is intentional, or at least knowing, and to punish that
conduct more severely. Second, recidivist prosecutors should be a
red flag to appellate courts, signaling that current sanctions may
not be adequately preventing future misconduct. Although
intentional misconduct is always troubling, when the same
prosecutor or the same office repeatedly misbehaves after
warnings from appellate courts, the conduct is more disturbing
because it suggests that the prosecutors believe they are a law unto
themselves beyond meaningful judicial control.
Other than censuring through reversals, the commonsense
remedy for recidivist prosecutors is to reveal them by naming
them, by reprimanding them in published opinions, and even by
referring them to local bars for discipline. However, one of the
striking realities of the forty-five recent federal reversals is that
239. Id. at 28 (quoting United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.
1989), which in turn quoted Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
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despite findings of intentional misconduct and extensive criticism
of prosecutors' conduct, not one court ordered a prosecutor
disciplined or referred a prosecutor for discipline. Most courts
appear to believe that their disapproval of the conduct, especially
when combined with a reversal, is a sufficient means to deter
future misconduct. In only six of the federal reversals did the
court's opinion mention the prosecutor by name,2 40 a step thought
to be publicly embarrassing and a more severe admonishment.24'
In contrast, in People v. Hill, the California Supreme Court named
the prosecutor over 120 times and referred her for disciplinary
proceedings before the California State Bar.242
The prosecutor in Hill appears to be the most serious repeat
offender mentioned by name in reported decisions. Based on this
author's research, she joins the select company of only five other
prosecutors and one prosecutorial office who have been cited by
appellate courts for repeated acts of misconduct in argument.
These prosecutors are: (1) an Assistant United States Attorney in
Corpus Christi, Texas, cited by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit for repeated acts of misconduct from 1978 to
1981; 243 (2) an assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, who in 1973 was cited by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which noted his misconduct in three
prior cases; ' 4 (3) a Washoe County, Nevada, assistant district
240. United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (11 th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 (11 th
Cir. 1994); Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667, 669 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1990); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 349-50 (2d
Cir. 1990).
241. See Meares, supra note 4, at 897. In United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir.
1993), the court included the prosecutor's name in the original draft of the opinion, but on
motion of the prosecutor, the name was removed from the published version. See Judith
Resnick, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role
of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1471, 1521
n. 180 (1994); see generally GERSHMAN, supra note 2, § 13.4.
242. People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 703 n.13 (Cal. 1998).
243. See United States v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United
States v. Okenfuss, 632 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Handly, 591
F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1979), and noting that the same prosecutor's misconduct in
United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663-66 (5th Cir. 1979), had required reversal).
244. See United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 62-63 n.l (2d Cir. 1973) (citing
United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 741-42 n.23 (2d Cir. 1973), United States v.
Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (2d Cir. 1973), and United States v. Echavarria, 486 F.2d
1397 (2d Cir. 1973) (unpublished)).
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attorney who in 1984 had two entirely separate cases consolidated
for appeal, had both reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, and
became the only prosecutor in reported decisions ever fined by an
appellate court for misconduct in argument at trial;2 45 (4) an
assistant Florida State Attorney, who was cited two times in 1993
by the Florida Court of Appeals;2 46 and (5) a prosecutor in
Missouri who in three cases in the early 1980s made essentially
the same closing argument to juries, that "if you think he did it
and if that thought is reasonable, beyond a reasonable doubt, then




The entire office of the United States Attorney for the District
of Puerto Rico was cited twenty-four times between 1987 and
1998 by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
for improper closing argument. The experience of the First Circuit
in trying to control the closing arguments of the prosecutors in that
office is a lesson on how resistant prosecutors can be to appellate
court efforts, and instructive on the need for sanctions less than
reversal but more than verbal spanking. Although this article
focuses on reversals in the 1990s, an artificial cutoff in 1990
would not accurately describe the record because a high volume of
misconduct in arguments in Puerto Rico began to appear in the
appellate reports in 1987. Since 1987, there have been at least
twenty-five decisions, two of which are unpublished, in which the
First Circuit has found improper arguments by an Assistant United
States Attorney trying a case in the District of Puerto Rico.2 48 Of
245. See McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Nev. 1984) (citing Williams v. State,
No. 14754, 808 P.2d 26 (Nev. 1984) (unpublished)).
246. See Klepak v. State, 622 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Landry v. State, 620
So. 2d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also Tobin, Note and Comment, supra note 4, at
498 n.118.
247. See State v. Shelby, 634 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo. 1982) (citing prior misconduct in
State v. Bumfin, 606 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Mo. 1980), and State v. Jones, 615 S.W.2d 416,
418 (Mo. 1981).
248. In chronological order, they are:
1. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 132-34 (1st Cir. 1987) (although analogy to
plan to kill judge and comparison to Peter's denial of Christ were comments that "warrant
especial condemnation," neither warrant reversal because, though deliberate, judge's
instructions were clear and evidence of conspiracy was strong).
2. United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 273-74 (1st Cir. 1987) (prosecutor
improperly vouched for a prosecution witness and "edged across [the] border to forbidden
terrain," though it was not plain error).
3. United States v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d 371, 374-75 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing
as plain error an argument, contrary to evidence and potentially crucial to prosecution for
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transporting an illegal alien, that defendant was himself an illegal immigrant).
4. United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 842 F.2d 5, 9 (lst Cir. 1988) (prosecutor's
"not my friend outburst" in response to defense counsel's reference to him as such was
obviously spontaneous, and cannot be characterized as deliberate, even assuming that it
was misconduct).
5. United States v. D(e, 860 F.2d 488, 492-95 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that long
summation in which highly inflammatory rhetoric used urging jurors to get "mad" at
defendants was "fundamental violation ... designed to encourage the jury to decide on an
improper basis" in violation of ethical rules, but not plain error in light of overwhelming
evidence).
6. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that prosecutor's vouching, by assuring that government witness was telling the truth,
calling defendant a "liar" twice and a "crook," and boasting that he had courage to call
these names was clearly improper, but not reversible because counterbalanced by improper
argument by defense, strong and clear instructions by trial judge, the jury's acquittal on
other counts, and overwhelming evidence).
7. United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding comments
like drugs "are poisoning our community and our kids die because of this" were improper,
but not plain error because isolated, curative instructions were given and evidence
overwhelming).
8. United States v. de Leon Davis, 914 F.2d 340, 344-45 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
comments that defendant's other trips to Spain were those of international drug trafficker
"approach[ed] the outer limit of permissible argument" and "conjecture, but not wild
speculation" were not reversible error where repetitions of "not evidence" jury
instructions cured error and jury acquitted on one count).
9. United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding improper references to "brutal" drug killings and "deadly trade of narcotics
trafficking," and to defendant's "greediness" and "evilness" were not plain error given
strength of evidence and lack of objection even though "the prosecutor's remarks might
have, under other circumstances, placed the conviction at risk").
10. United States v. Quesada-Bonilla, 952 F.2d 597, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding closing argument that jury should do justice for victim in this case was improper
but not reversible because there was no particular need to require a new trial in this case as
a "sanction" to deter future misconduct).
11. United States v. Hodge-Balwing, 952 F.2d 607, 610-11 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that any possible prejudice from prosecution argument that might be interpreted as
comment on defendant's silence was cured by strong instruction, and other improper
arguments were not objected to and not plain error even though prosecutor "strayed
beyond the permissible evidentiary borders").
12. United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 120 (1st Cir. 1992) ("While we
disapprove of many of the prosecutor's statements, we do not think they amounted to plain
error." Prosecutor undoubtedly violated "fundamental precepts" when she called
defendant a "liar" and stated her personal beliefs, but not reversible because of invited
response doctrine, lack of objection, and clear instructions.).
13. Unites States v. Soto-Alvarez, 958 F.2d 473, 477-78 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding
prosecutor's incorrect argument that passport of alleged coconspirator showed trip to
Venezuela was not plain error because any prejudice affected count which court reversed
on other grounds).
14. United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding remark
that jury should give judge opportunity to decide on sentencing by finding defendant guilty
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was not plain error).
15. United States v. Morales-Cartagena, 987 F.2d 849, 854-55 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding minor misstatement of fact in closing argument was not plain error).
16. United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 441 (Ist Cir. 1993) (argument
accusing defense counsel of attempting to confuse and intimidate jurors not so prejudicial
as to require reversal in this case, but questions why "after numerous warnings from this
court, the prosecuting attorneys in the District of Puerto Rico persist in spiking their
arguments with comments that put their cases at risk").
17. Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
"150-proof" war on drugs rhetoric as reversible error in light of previous decisions which
had made clear that milder versions of such conduct were improper; court notes that
responsibility lies not so much with inexperienced trial attorney, but with supervisors who
did not even concede error on appeal).
18. People v. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1st Cir. 1993) (reversing for
deliberate non-disclosure of evidence tending to corroborate defense of duress and for
deliberate arguing that defense was untrue because there was no evidence to corroborate it
as a theme of closing argument).
19. United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 777 (1st Cir. 1994) (statement about
credibility of government turncoat witness was not plain error because "[any vouching
which may have occurred was so faint as to be virtually indiscernible even to the trained
ear" ).
20. United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (1st Cir. 1995)
(misconduct in using good and evil analogy and vouching for witnesses was deliberate,
came at the end of government's summation, and court gave no curative instruction, but it
was an isolated event, there was strong evidence against defendant, and general
instructions were somewhat curative; "[n]otwithstanding our decision in this regard, we
repeat our concern that, 'after numerous warnings from this court, the prosecuting
attorneys in the District of Puerto Rico persist in spiking their arguments with comments
that put their cases at risk' ").
21. United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 712-14 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding references to Lent, the cross, and catholicism of prosecutor and jurors when
defendant may have been a member of minority religious sect was "flatly improper," but not
reversible because defense counsel objected but did not pursue curative instruction at a
sidebar following the argument and evidence of guilt was "very strong").
22. United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1996) (prosecutor's
remark that former wife of co-conspirator turned informer fled to protect herself was
improper but sustaining of objections and instructions cured any prejudice).
23. United States v. Fernandez, Nos. 95-1864, 95-2067, 1996 WL 469009, at 16-17
(1st Cir., Aug. 20, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (recognizing numerous misstatements of
evidence, including remarks disparaging defense as trying to confuse the jury, but holding
not plain error).
24. United States v. Rodriguez-Carmona, No. 95-2277, 1997 WL 157738, at *4 (1st
Cir., Mar. 26, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (holding vouching describing government's
investigation "could fairly be understood to imply that the government had an additional
source of information" and other remarks may have suggested that prosecutor's experience
showed that defendant was guilty; but not reversible because "both of the remarks
challenged here appear to be instances of accidental overkill rather than a deliberate
attempt to mislead the jury" ).
25. United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 136 F.3d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1998)
(prosecutor's remark-" Don't let yourselves be confused by the definition of reasonable
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these, only three resulted in reversals-two in 1993249 and one in
1987.250 Thus, the other twenty-two decisions affirmed convictions
even though the court found improprieties by the prosecutor.
In this series of cases, the First Circuit has' sent messages to
the prosecutors in Puerto Rico in a variety of ways including the
following: condemning only the conduct in the particular case;
admonishing the individual prosecutor who engaged in the
conduct;.5 reproaching supervisors foi failing to give proper
guidance to trial attorneys;.52 identifying that the problem as a
recurrent one in the office;25 3 threatening reversals for similar
conduct in future;254 suggesting, but not ordering, discipline of the
prosecutor;255 and actually reversing. 6 Given that in 1998, even
doubt" -was not plain error because it was not clear how jury took it, there were curative
instructions, and strong evidence; court notes history of misconduct in argument in
prosecutor's office).
249. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d at 1101; Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 525.
250. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d at 371.
251. de eon Davis, 914 F.2d at 344-45 (only case of the 25 that named the prosecutor);
Doe, 860 F.2d at 495 ("Notwithstanding the affirmance of the convictions, we strongly
admonish the conduct of the government's representative in this case."); see also Quesada-
Bonilla, 952 F.2d at 602 (approving reprimand of attorney by district court and citing
reprimand as reason reversal not necessary).
252. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.2d at 1009 ("When, as in this case, a visiting Justice Department
prosecutor conducts the trial, we nevertheless expect the resident United States Attorney to
insure that the expectations of the court concerning closing argument be made known.");
Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 530 (" [T]he unhappy outcome in this case-including the expense
of retrial, the waste of the trial court's time, and the burden on the appellants-is less a
reproach to the individual assistant U.S. attorney than to those who superintend young
prosecutors in the district in question."); see also Fernandez, 1996 WL 469009 at *18
(quoting United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 1996), for proposition that "a
pattern of faults does suggest a failure in supervision").
253. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 136 F.3d at 10 ("We do note a long history of improper
statements in closing argument from federal prosecutors in Puerto Rico.... In light of this
history, the government gains no advantage under the first factor.") (citations omitted); Levy-
Cordero, 67 F.2d at 1008 (" [W]e repeat our concern that, 'after numerous warnings from this
court, the prosecuting attorneys in the District of Puerto Rico persist in spiking their
arguments with comments that put their cases at risk.' "); Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d at 441
("[A]fter numerous warnings from this court, the prosecuting attorneys in the District of
Puerto Rico persist in spiking their arguments with comments that put their cases at risk.").
254. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, Nos. 95-1864, 95-2067, 1996 WL 469009, at
* 17 (1st Cir., Aug. 20, 1996) (describing decision not to reverse as "close call"); United
States v. Rodriquez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he prosecutor's
remarks might have, under other circumstances, placed the conviction at risk.").
255. United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Rather than reversal on
appeal, the proper remedy would have been a reprimand or the imposition of sanctions by the
district court."). The court itself took no steps to discipline the prosecutor or direct the district
court to do so.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
after more than a decade of fairly strong action by an appellate
court, a panel of the court still felt it necessary to note the "long
history of improper statements in closing argument from federal
prosecutors in Puerto Rico" 257 as a factor in considering whether to
reverse for improprieties in closing argument, the First Circuit
appears to have not been fully successful in reforming the
behavior of this office.
It appears that a major flaw in the First Circuit's exercise of
supervisory power over the past decade has been its reliance on
admonitions rather than outright reversals or, at least, lesser
sanctions. The court's approach to the problem of improper
arguments in Puerto Rico has been to assume that the prosecutors
in that district shared the court's view that their role was to assure
a just result, not obtain convictions at any cost, and that
prosecutors would not only heed the letter of specific precedents,
but comply with the spirit and rationale of appellate court rulings.
For six years, in sixteen cases, the court looked at the cases in
isolation, not even mentioning the pattern of behavior by the entire
office.
In the cases in 1987, the court relied on its disapproval as the
way to regulate prosecutorial conduct. At first it used phrases like
"warrant especial condemnation,""' and "edged across the border
to forbidden terrain,"259 to convey its message of disapproval in
cases it did not reverse. Oddly, in the one case in which it did
reverse, the tone was much less condemnatory, with the court
stating the issue before it as "whether the prosecutor's error in
mischaracterizing defendant's own entry into the United States as
'illegal' amounted to plain error within Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 26°
Instead of condemning the prosecutor, the court seemed much
more concerned with defense counsel to whom it gave a stern
lecture on proper procedure:
Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 51, a party is expected "at the time
the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, [to make]
256. See People v. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Arrieta-
Agressot, 3 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d 371 (1st
Cir. 1987).
257. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 136 F.3d at 10.
258. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133 (1st Cir. 1987).
259. United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1987).
260. United States v. Santana-Camacho, 833 F.2d 371, 373 (1st Cir. 1987).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
known to the court the action which that party desires the
court to take.... "At the time the Assistant United States
Attorney misrepresented the evidence concerning Santana's
status, Santana's counsel should have pointed out the
mistake to the district court and requested corrective action.
Had he done so, the district court would doubtless have
cleared up the mistake, and, failing that, redress on appeal
would have been easily obtainable. Unfortunately,
however, no objection whatever was registered. 6'
Nonetheless, the court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's
statements constituted plain error. The reversal in Santana resulted
from the court's conclusion that the false statement that, in a case
charging defendant with knowingly transporting an illegal alien,
the defendant was himself an illegal alien "was so major and so
prejudicial that it could have caused a miscarriage of justice." 262
No mention was made of the impact of unsupported or false
arguments on the integrity of the judicial system or of the need to
deter such conduct.
In 1988, the court took a stronger rhetorical stance. In United
States v. Doe,263 the court declined to reverse for plain error even
though the prosecutor's remarks, urging the jury to get "mad" at
defendants for all the evils drugs inflicted on society, were
"clearly improper,"2 64 "fundamental violations" 2 65 and "designed
to encourage the jury to decide on an improper basis."266 The court
reasoned that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming, the
defense so implausible (that defendants' ship was boarded by
pirates and they were forced by the pirates, who later fled, to take
on eight million dollars worth of marijuana), and the jury
sufficiently discerning (having acquitted on one count) that "the
prosecutor's egregious misconduct had no effect on the outcome
261. Id.
262. Id. The court was also at pains not to criticize the trial judge:
Here, we find no fault with the trial judge, who was entitled to assume that the
prosecutor would not misstate the evidence and that, if he did, defense counsel
would call the misstatement to the court's attention.
Id. This seems unduly charitable to the trial judge. He should have paid close enough attention
at trial to know that there was no evidence that defendant was an illegal alien.
263. 860 F.3d 488, 492-495 (1st Cir. 1988).
264. Id. at 492.
265. Id. at 494.
266. Id.
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of appellants' trial."267 Despite the affirmance in Doe, or perhaps
because of it, the court was forceful in its condemnation of both
the prosecutor and, indirectly, of the trial judge. The prosecutor's
remarks that defendants were "four innocent bastards," which had
been objected to at trial, should have been dealt with directly by
the trial judge. "Rather than reversal on appeal, the proper remedy
would have been a reprimand or the imposition of sanctions by the
district court." 
2 68
The court was even more emphatic about the unobjected-to
portions of the prosecutor's long, inflammatory argument blaming
defendants for taking "a license to kill our youth in the United
States, to poison the minds of our people" 26 9 and telling the jury:
I am mad when I see these people trying to destroy our
society and I think that you should be mad too. I think
when you have the opportunity to see drug smugglers
before you that you should be mad. I don't know if you
have children or your children's children, but we are here
270to protect you.
The court recognized this argument as an ethical violation,'
and then noted that "[w]hile such behavior, as violations of local
rules, may provide cause for the district court to sanction the
prosecutors, it may also constitute reversible error when it is not
stopped by the trial judge and followed by a strong and succinct
curative instruction."2 72 After explaining that reversal was not
appropriate in this case, it concluded by stating, "Notwithstanding
the affirmnance of the convictions, we strongly admonish the
conduct of the government's representative in this case.' 273 In
short, the court admonished, but did not name the prosecutor;
adverted to, but did not actually refer the matter for disciplinary
proceedings in the district court; and suggested that trial judges
should intervene sua sponte to stop such arguments and give a
curative instruction. The court appeared to assume that its strong
267. Id at 495.
268. Id. at 492.
269. Id. at 493.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 494 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e),
incorporated as Puerto Rican local rule 211.4(B)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 495.
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words, without specific action, would be enough to deter future
improper argument.
If the court expected its opinion in Doe to change behavior, it
was to be disappointed. Between 1989 and 1993, various panels of
the First Circuit found improper the arguments of a prosecutor in
Puerto Rico on ten occasions. Curiously, after Doe, the court
adopted a milder tone, indicating in individual cases that conduct
was improper, but never reversing and never mentioning any
overall pattern among prosecutors in the district. Ironically, in
United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona,274 the court issued a stem
warning to prosecutors about using other-crimes evidence
excessively:
We notice that this is a recurrent problem, particularly in
criminal appeals from the District of Puerto Rico, where the
government's representation unnecessarily continues to
push Rule 404(b) to its outer limits. We have issued fair
warning on this subject, and future conduct of this nature
may imperil otherwise valid convictions.27
Yet, there was no mention of the recurring pattern of
improper closing argument in the same district and no similar
warning to desist from improper closings other than an indication
in one case "that the prosecutor's remarks might have, under other
circumstances, placed the conviction at risk. 276
It was not until June of 1993 that the court finally noted a
recurring pattern. In United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia,77 the court
commented: "We do not understand, however, why, after
numerous warnings from this court, the prosecuting attorneys in
the District of Puerto Rico persist in spiking their arguments with
comments that put their cases at risk." 278 Although this was the
sixteenth case between 1987 and 1993 in which a panel of the
First Circuit found improper a closing argument by a federal
prosecutor in Puerto Rico, the opinion cited only three cases279 and
274. 924 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1991).
275. Id. at 1153.
276. Id. at 1154.
277. 996 F.2d 436 (1st Cir. 1993).
278. Id. at 441.
279. United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 120 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Soto-Alvarez, 958 F.2d 473, 477-78 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. de Leon Davis, 914
F.2d 340, 344-45 (1st Cir. 1990).
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did not mention that two of them apparently involved the same
prosecutor.
280
In September of 1993, in Arrieta-Agressot v. United States,"28'
a panel of the First Circuit reversed a conviction on the grounds
that the prosecutor's "several paragraphs of 150-proof rhetoric" in
closing argument "overstep the bounds by a wide margin" and
were plain error.282 "[G]iven the potency of the misstatements and
the presence of direct exculpatory testimony, ' 283  the court
concluded, "the prosecutor's repeated appeals to impermissible
considerations might well have altered the verdict."2 84 The court
thought it "crystal clear that inflammatory language of this ilk
falls well outside the bounds of permissible argument ' 28 5 and
noted that in two cases from the Puerto Rico "we sharply rebuked
the prosecutor[s] for making... [similar] comments because ....
[i]t is hard enough for a jury to remain dispassionate and objective
amidst the tensions and turmoil of a criminal trial, and this is not
the occasion for superheated rhetoric from the government urging
jurors to enlist in the war on drugs." 86
The court saved its strongest criticism for the supervisors of
the trial attorney. First, it noted that it was "remarkable, in light of
Machor, Doe, and the slew of other recent cases in this circuit, that
the government defends as proper its closing argument in this
case." 287 Then, in assigning responsibility for the result, the
opinion pointed directly at the supervisors:
[T]he prosecutor was inexperienced at the time of the
trial, as he candidly told us at oral argument, and we do not
dwell further on personal fault. In fact, the unhappy
outcome in this case-including the expense of retrial, the
waste of the trial court's time, and the burden on
280. The court in de Leon Davis mentioned the prosecutor by name in quoting the
transcript of the offending remarks. 914 F.2d at 344. In Nickens, the name of the same female
prosecutor was listed as one of the government attorneys who briefed the case. 955 F.2d 112,
114 (1st Cir. 1992). This is often an indication that she was the trial attorney. In addition, the
opinion in Nickens referred to the prosecutor as "her." See id. at 116.
281. 3 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1993).
282. Id. at 530.
283. Id. at 529.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 527.
286. Id. (citing United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989)).
287. Id. at 527-28.
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appellants-is less a reproach to the individual assistant
U.S. attorney than to those who superintend young
prosecutors in the district in question.
There is ample basis for the prosecutor's view that the
drug problem facing this country is "corrupting and
disrupting the society." But federal prosecuting attorneys
ought to be mindful of the harm done when those in power
ignore the rules governing their own conduct while
demanding strict compliance from others."
Four months later, a different First Circuit panel (with no
common judges) reversed another conviction from the District of
Puerto Rico. In United States v. Udechukwu,289 defendant had
claimed that she was coerced by a drug trafficker into carrying the
drugs for possession of which she was being prosecuted. The
prosecution investigated the claim and had information
corroborating the existence of a prominent drug trafficker in
Aruba with a name strikingly similar to the man defendant
claimed coerced her. Instead of revealing this information to the
defense, the prosecutor used a "persistent theme in closing
argument suggesting the nonexistence of this information-and
even the opposite of what the government knew."2 9 The court
held that this was reversible error because the combination of the
failure to disclose the corroborating information and the
statements in the closing argument at trial that cast doubt on the
existence of the drug trafficker damaged defendant's credibility,
which was crucial to her duress defense.29' Perhaps because the
panel saw this as primarily a Brady case, as opposed to a
misconduct-in-closing-argument case, the opinion made no
mention of any pattern of misconduct in argument by prosecutors
in Puerto Rico.
The impact of these two reversals and the strong language,
particularly in Arrieta, is difficult to assess. The First Circuit has
not had occasion to reverse another conviction from the District of
Puerto Rico because of improper argument, though it has reversed
288. Id. at 530.
289. 11 F.3d 1101 (Ist Cir. 1993).
290. Id. at 1105.
291. Id.
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three cases from other districts for that reason since 1993.292 On the
one hand, the lack of reversals by a court ready to reverse in an
appropriate case suggests there may have been some improvement
in prosecutor's arguments after the reversals. The number of cases
in which the appellate court found the argument of a prosecutor
from Puerto Rico improper went from thirteen in the five-year
period from 1989 through 1993 to seven in the almost five-year
period since January 1, 1994. Moreover, none of the cases since
1993 have involved the war on drugs rhetoric that resulted in the
reversal in Arrieta or the combination of withholding evidence and
false argument condemned in Udechukwu.
Clearly, however, three panels of the First Circuit remain
dissatisfied with the overall performance of the prosecutors in
Puerto Rico. In United States v. Levy-Corero, the court found
similarities between the prosecutor's remarks regarding religion
and good and evil there and the improper arguments in Arrieta in
that they "improperly appeal to the jury to act in ways other than
as dispassionate arbiters of he facts." 2 9 4 Moreover, the court felt
constrained to note that even though it was not reversing:
[W]e repeat our concern that, "after numerous warnings
from this court, the prosecuting attorneys in the District of
Puerto Rico persist in spiking their arguments with
comments that put their cases at risk." .... When, as in
this case, a visiting Justice Department prosecutor conducts
the trial, we nevertheless expect the resident United States
Attorney to insure that the expectations of the court
concerning closing argument be made known."'
In United States v. Fernandez,296 an unpublished opinion in
1996, the court found numerous misstatements of evidence,
though "a close call," did not amount to plain error, but noted that
292. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing for plain error for
commenting on defendant's failure to testify, telling jury that defendant has burden of proving
innocence, and giving argument not supported by the evidence); United States v. Hardy, 37
F.3d 753 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing for Griffin error in arguing that defendants were "still
running and hiding"); United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversal for
pervasive misconduct including urging jury to "take responsibility for your community").
293. 67 F.2d 1002, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995).
294. Id. at 1008.
295. Id. at 1009 (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 441 (1st Cir.
1993) (citing Udechukwu and Arrieta as examples of the risk prosecutors are facing when
they argue improperly).
296. Nos. 95-1864, 95-2067, 1996 WL 469009, at *16-17 (1st Cir., Aug. 20, 1996).
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it was "concerned by the sheer quantity of errors, however minor,
in this case," that the prosecution "should weigh carefully its
words when it next approaches the floor for argument," and that
"a pattern of faults does suggest a failure of supervision." 2 97
Finally, in 1998, in United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez,"' the
court, although it rejected the argument that a prosecutor's
remarks urging the jury not to be "confused by the definition of
reasonable doubt" was plain error, again felt it necessary to "note
a long history of improper statements in closing argument from
federal prosecutors in Puerto Rico" and made research into that
history easier by including citations to two recent unpublished
opinions to its list of cases in which improper arguments were
made.299
The history of the substantial efforts by the First Circuit to
restrain the closing arguments of the prosecutors in Puerto Rico is
thus mixed. On the one hand, it appears progress has been made,
especially since the two reversals in 1993. This suggests that
appropriate use of the power to reverse is a useful tool for
appellate courts to gain credibility with prosecutors. On the other
hand, the court's assumption that admonishing prosecutors would
change their behavior appears to have placed too much faith in the
willingness of the prosecutors to abide by rulings unless they
suffered consequences.
What was missing from the appellate court's responses
during the decade was any meaningful sanction short of reversal.
Given the constraints of the Supreme Court's requirement that
appellate courts apply harmless error analysis and its limitations
on the use of supervisory power as a justification for reversal, the
sanction of reversal is available in only a limited number of cases.
It is precisely in the cases in which reversal is not available that
appellate courts need some means to affect the conduct of
prosecutors.
Yet the First Circuit did little but admonish prosecutors. In
only one case did the court even see fit to use the informal
sanction of naming the prosecutor in its opinion as a sanction.3°° In
Doe, the one case in which court mentioned the possibility of
297. Id. at *18 (quoting United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1996)).
298. 136 F.3d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1998).
299. Id. at 10.
300. See United States v. de Leon Davis, 914 F.2d 340, 344-45 (1st Cir. 1990).
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discipline under district court rules, the court made no direct order
that anything actually be done. Thus, it is not surprising that
prosecutors continue to engage in improper argument.
The picture of prosecutorial recalcitrance that emerges from
the continuing saga of the First Circuit and the government
attorneys who make up the office of the United States Attorney for
the District of Puerto Rico is a daunting one for any court, policy
maker, or commentator concerned with controlling such behavior.
It suggests that it takes a commitment not only to enforce the law
through reversals, but also through an arsenal of sanctions below
the level of reversal that could impose meaningful restraints on
prosecutors in cases where reversal appears unwarranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
This study of People v. Hill, recent federal reversals, and the
case study of a recidivist prosecutorial office has reached the
following conclusions: First, the standards of proper prosecutorial
misconduct in argument are sufficiently clear that virtually all
courts that reversed were unanimous in their view that the conduct
was improper. Thus, the arguments that resulted in reversals were
almost always ones that prosecutors knew or should have known
were improper. Second, once conduct is found improper, doctrine
concerning when reversal is appropriate is complex, is
misunderstood by the courts of appeals, and is particularly
convoluted and conflicting on the role of intent in reversals. Third,
the case study of recidivist prosecutors suggests that if courts wish
to control the conduct of prosecutors, they need to consider the
history of the prosecutor or office and have available an integrated
arsenal of weapons, including both reversals and lesser sanctions.
In the second of this two-part series, the author will further
explore reversal doctrine; suggest a coherent, comprehensive
system for conducting harmless error analysis; propose
clarifications of doctrine that would allow courts to take into
account the fact that the prosecutor knew or should have known
that his or her conduct was improper (and do so within the
existing limits on court power to reverse only for prejudicial
error); and propose an integrated system of reversal doctrine and
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lesser sanctions that would allow courts to effectively
discourage misconduct in argument.
